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EMPLOYER MONITORING OF EMPLOYEE 
EMAIL:  ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 
SHOULD ATTACH TO COMMUNICATIONS THAT 
THE CLIENT BELIEVED WERE CONFIDENTIAL 
Alex DeLisi* 
 
Emails feel like private, confidential communications.  But in the 
workplace, employers often retain the right to monitor every 
communication sent or received by an employee on an employer-owned 
device or network.  This Note addresses the issue of whether attorney-client 
privilege should attach to communications made between an employee and 
her private attorney over a system monitored by her employer.  When 
addressing this issue, most district and state courts apply a test that seeks to 
determine the reasonableness of the employee’s expectation of 
confidentiality in the attorney-client communication.  However, courts 
differ in how they apply the expectation of reasonableness test, with nearly 
every court finding a different fact dispositive.  This Note argues that 
attorneys, employers, and courts should instead use a three-pronged 
approach:  first, attorneys should seek to prevent monitored 
communications with their clients from occurring in the first place; second, 
employers should take precautions to prevent their employees’ attorney-
client communications from becoming nonconfidential; and third, courts 
should allow attorney-client privilege to attach to communications that the 
client believed were confidential.  This three-pronged approach is 
consistent with the doctrine’s other exceptions to a strict confidentiality 
requirement and realigns attorney-client privilege with its public policy 
goals. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Emails feel like private conversations.  At work, however, employers’ 
internet monitoring policies render personal emails nonprivate.1  Many 
employer policies reserve the right to monitor every single email sent or 
received by employees.2  A recent New York Times analysis concluded that 
“no matter what you are trying to hide in your email in-box . . . it is possible 
that someone will find out.”3  This creates a tension between an employee’s 
expectation of privacy in his or her work computer files and emails, and the 
lack of actual privacy.4 
In 2003, employees of Asia Global Crossing (AGC), a pan-Asian 
telecommunications carrier, sent personal emails over AGC’s company 
system to their personal counsel.5  AGC filed for bankruptcy protection and 
the appointed bankruptcy trustee began investigating certain transactions 
involving the employees.6  The trustee brought a motion to compel 
production of the employees’ emails, but the employees resisted on the 
grounds that the emails were protected by attorney-client privilege.7 
Drawing on Fourth Amendment case law concerning expectations of 
privacy, Chief Bankruptcy Judge Stuart Bernstein of the Southern District 
of New York established a four-factor test that has since become the “most 
oft-quoted” test8 for determining whether an employee’s use of a 
company’s email system destroys the attorney-client privilege:   
(1) Does the employer have a policy banning employees’ personal use of 
computers; (2) Does the employer monitor employees’ computer use; 
(3) Do third parties have a right of access to employees’ computers and 
emails; and (4) Were the employees notified or aware of the employer’s 
use and monitoring policy.9   
In the case of AGC’s employees, Judge Bernstein held that because 
attorney-client privilege would have otherwise attached to their 
 
 1. See Matt Villano, The Workplace:  Your Company Monitors Your Personal Email, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/05/business/worldbusiness/
05iht-workcol06.4803648.html. 
 2. See id. 
 3. See Nicole Perlroth, Trying To Keep Your E-mails Secret When the C.I.A. Chief 
Couldn’t, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2012, at B1. 
 4. See In re United States, 665 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1224 (D. Or. 2009) (discussing “a 
fundamental misunderstanding of the lack of privacy we all have in our e-mails.  Some 
people seem to think that they are as private as letters, phone calls, or journal entries.  The 
blunt fact is, they are not.”). 
 5. See In re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd., 322 B.R. 247, 252 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 6. See id. at 252–53. 
 7. See id. 
 8. Goldstein v. Colborne Acquisition Co., 873 F. Supp. 2d 932, 935 (N.D. Ill. 2012). 
 9. Hanson v. First Nat’l Bank, No. 5:10-0906, 2011 WL 5201430, at *3 (S.D. W. Va. 
Oct. 31, 2011) (summarizing Asia Global Crossing’s four-factor test). 
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communications, the employees’ use of the company’s email system, 
without more, did not destroy the privilege.10 
This Note analyzes the circumstances that should be required for 
attorney-client privilege to attach to electronic communications that are 
monitored by employers.  It argues for a three-pronged approach.  First, 
lawyers should seek to prevent nonconfidential communications from 
occurring by discussing the degree of confidentiality of their client’s 
workplace systems and how the lack of confidentiality might undermine 
attorney-client privilege.  Second, if employers monitor attorney-client 
communications, employers should attempt to avoid reading them so that, 
even though they were technically nonconfidential, courts may still 
consider them privileged.  Third, courts should allow the privilege to attach 
when the employee believed that her communications with her attorney 
were confidential.  The third prong represents a new exception to the 
confidentiality requirement of attorney-client privilege doctrine; when an 
employer monitors an employee’s electronic communications with her 
lawyer, the employee’s belief that the communication was confidential 
should dictate whether the privilege attaches. 
This Note proceeds in three parts.  Part I offers an overview of attorney-
client privilege, including a history of the privilege and an examination of 
how the privilege functions when a third party, such as an employer, 
monitors attorney-client communications.  Part II explores the approaches 
that courts use and that commentators have proposed to determine when the 
privilege attaches to employer-monitored attorney-client communications.  
Part III argues that the public policy of promoting client candor in attorney-
client communications necessitates a three-pronged approach, including the 
allowance of a new exception to the confidentiality requirement when the 
client believed that a monitored communication was confidential. 
I.  ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND EMPLOYER MONITORING 
This part discusses attorney-client privilege in four subparts:  Part I.A 
offers an overview of attorney-client privilege.  Next, Part I.B traces the 
history of the confidentiality requirement as it evolved to stay consistent 
with the privilege’s public policy goals.  Part I.C then examines employer 
monitoring of employee communications and the impact such monitoring 
has on the confidentiality of employee communications.  Lastly, Part I.D 
summarizes past scholarship arguing that lawyers or employers should 
prevent monitored attorney-client communications from occurring. 
A.  Overview of Attorney-Client Privilege 
This subpart first considers the history of attorney-client privilege before 
outlining the four elements of the modern privilege. 
 
 10. See Asia Global Crossing, 322 B.R. at 265. 
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1.  History of Attorney-Client Privilege 
The attorney-client privilege first arose in the sixteenth century and is the 
oldest of the common law privileges.11  Initially the privilege protected an 
attorney from testifying against his client, as that was thought to be 
“dishonorable and ungentlemanly.”12  In the eighteenth century, the purpose 
of the privilege evolved to protect the client instead of the attorney, by 
incorporating the understanding that the nature of the attorney-client 
relationship required security for the client.13 
American courts adopted the privilege from English common law, and 
the U.S. Supreme Court first formally recognized the privilege in 1826.14  
In England, only attorney-client communications made in anticipation of or 
during a dispute were protected by the privilege.15  Unlike English common 
law, early case law in the United States did not require that communications 
were made in anticipation of litigation.16 
The modern understanding of the privilege is that it facilitates the client’s 
complete disclosure, which allows the attorney to give accurate and useful 
legal advice.17  The Supreme Court has held that attorney-client privilege 
promotes “public interests in the observance of law and the administration 
of justice.  The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy 
serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the 
lawyer’s being fully informed by the client.”18 
2.  Nature of the Privilege:  Four Elements 
The mere fact that a client communicates with an attorney does not 
necessarily make the communication privileged.19  Courts generally follow 
 
 11. See Klitzman v. Krut, 744 F.2d 955, 960 (3d Cir. 1984); see also 1 PAUL R. RICE, 
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES § 1:2 (1999). 
 12. RONALD GOLDFARB, IN CONFIDENCE:  WHEN TO PROTECT SECRECY AND WHEN TO 
REQUIRE DISCLOSURE 60 (2009). 
 13. See id.; see also Pearse v. Pearse, (1846) 63 Eng. Rep. 950 (H.L.) 957 (“Truth, like 
all other good things may be loved unwisely—maybe pursued too keenly—may cost too 
much.  And surely the meanness and mischief of prying into a man’s confidential 
consultations with his legal adviser, the general evil of infusing reserve and dissimulation, 
uneasiness, and suspicion and fear, into the communications which must take place, and 
which, unless in a condition of perfect security, must take place uselessly or worse, are too 
great a price to pay for truth itself.”); 1 RICE, supra note 11, § 1:3. 
 14. See Chirac v. Reinicker, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 280, 294 (1826); see also 1 RICE, supra 
note 11, § 1:1. 
 15. See Minet v. Morgan, L.R. 8 Ch. App. 361, 363 (1873). 
 16. See 1 RICE, supra note 11, § 1:12 (outlining the twenty reported cases in the United 
States prior to 1820, all of which “show no evidence of the pending or in anticipation of 
litigation limitation on the privilege” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 17. See, e.g., Hanson v. First Nat’l Bank, No. 5:10-0906, 2011 WL 5201430, at *5 (S.D. 
W. Va. Oct. 31, 2011). 
 18. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). 
 19. See 1 RICE, supra note 11, § 2:1; see also United States v. Constanzo, 625 F.2d 465, 
468 (3d Cir. 1980) (“[A] communication is not privileged simply because it is made by or to 
a person who happens to be a lawyer.” (quoting Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 
F.2d 596, 602 (8th Cir. 1977))). 
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a variation of Professor Wigmore’s eight requirements for a communication 
to be privileged: 
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal 
advisor in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that 
purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance 
permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal 
advisor, (8) except the protection be waived.20 
More recent recitations of the attorney-client privilege doctrine reduce its 
elements to four requirements:  (1) a communication (2) made between 
privileged parties (3) intended to be kept confidential and was kept 
confidential, (4) that was made for the purpose of obtaining or providing 
legal advice.21  The following four sections address each element in turn. 
a.  Requirement One:  A Communication 
The attorney and her client must communicate for the privilege to 
attach.22 The communication may be oral or written23 and protects the 
communication, not the underlying information communicated.24  In other 
words, a client cannot turn nonprivileged information into privileged 
information by simply communicating the matter to an attorney.25 
 
 20. 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2292 
(McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). 
 21. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 (2000) (listing 
the four elements of attorney-client privilege as “(1) a communication (2) made between 
privileged persons (3) in confidence (4) for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal 
assistance”); see also In re Cnty. of Erie, 473 F.3d 413, 419 (2d Cir. 2007) (listing three 
elements for the privilege). 
 22. See 1 RICE, supra note 11, § 2:1; see also 1 EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-
CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE 66 (5th ed. 2007). 
 23. See EPSTEIN, supra note 22, at 66.  The mode of communication does not directly 
affect whether the privilege applies. See Davenport v. Ind. Masonic Home Found., Inc., No. 
IP 00-1047-CH/G, 2003 WL 1888986, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 27, 2003) (upholding the 
privilege for a tape recording); Lintz v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., No. Civ.A. 98-2213-JWL, 1999 
WL 450197, at *4 (D. Kan. June 24, 1999) (upholding the privilege for a message the client 
had written on a fax cover sheet).  As discussed infra in Part I.B., the mode of 
communication can affect whether the privilege applies insofar as the mode could diminish 
the communication’s confidentiality. 
 24. See, e.g., United States v. James, 708 F.2d 40, 44 n.3 (2d Cir. 1983) (“[T]he 
privilege attaches not to the information but to the communication of the information.” 
(citation omitted)); Lynch v. Novant Med. Grp., Inc., No. 3:08cv340, 2009 WL 2915039, at 
*6 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 8, 2009) (“[I]t is the Plaintiff’s position that any information that she 
possesses regarding her case is protected by the attorney-client privilege as she is acting as 
her own attorney in this matter.  This argument is frivolous and has no support in the law.  
The attorney-client privilege protects only confidential communications between a party and 
her attorney.” (internal citation omitted)). 
 25. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 396 (1981) (“[The client] may 
not refuse to disclose any relevant fact within his knowledge merely because he incorporated 
a statement of such fact into his communication to his attorney.” (citation omitted)). 
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b.  Requirement Two:  Made Between Privileged Persons 
The attorney-client privilege applies only to communications between 
privileged persons.26  The privilege applies to communications made by 
attorneys and clients, as well as to agents of either party.27  For example, if 
an attorney retains a consulting firm to assist in representation, the privilege 
protects the firm’s communications with the attorney or client that contain 
the client’s confidential information.28  Moreover, the communication’s 
privileged status is not necessarily lost because the client has communicated 
the same facts to another party.29 
c.  Requirement Three:  Intended To Be, Reasonably Believed To Be, 
and in Fact Is, Kept Confidential 
A client must intend and reasonably believe that her communication will 
be confidential at the time the communication is made, and the 
communication must remain confidential for the privilege to apply.30  
Courts determine the reasonableness of the client’s belief that her 
communications are confidential from the circumstances surrounding the 
communication—specifically, whether the communications occurred in the 
presence of a third party.31  The factual circumstances dictate whether the 
communication is in the presence of third parties, thereby rendering it 
 
 26. See EPSTEIN, supra note 22, at 134; 1 RICE, supra note 11, §§ 2:1, 2:5, 5:5. 
 27. See EPSTEIN, supra note 22, at 134; 1 RICE, supra note 11, §§ 2:1, 2:5, 5:5. 
 28. See, e.g., Byrnes v. Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield, No. 98Civ.8520(BSJ)(MHD), 
1999 WL 1006312, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 1999) (“The communication by counsel to [the 
client] seeks assistance by the consultant in preparing a document that consists 
predominantly of legal advice rendered by the attorney to her client.  As such it is covered by 
the privilege.”); Att’y Gen. v. Covington & Burling, 430 F. Supp. 1117, 1121 (D.D.C. 1977) 
(“[T]he Court has granted the privilege to communications from [the accountants] only to 
the extent that disclosure would tend to reveal a confidence from the actual client to one of 
them or to the attorney.”). 
 29. See, e.g., United States v. Rakes, 136 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1998) (“[T]he privileged 
communication and the facts recounted within it are two different things.  Thus, a client does 
not normally lose the privilege as to communications with his attorney merely because he 
testifies at trial to the same events discussed with his lawyer.” (citation omitted)); High Tech 
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Panasonic Co., Civ. A. No. 94-1477, 1995 WL 45847, at *5 (E.D. La. 
Feb. 2, 1995) (“[A] party who merely discloses the facts contained in a privileged 
communication has not placed the communication at issue.”). 
 30. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 395 (upholding the privilege and emphasizing that the 
documents were intended to be and were kept confidential by the client company). See 
generally 1 RICE, supra note 11, § 6 (discussing the confidentiality requirement). 
 31. See United States v. Mejia, 655 F.3d 126, 133 (2d Cir.) (holding that a prisoner who 
knew that his calls were recorded could not have a reasonable expectation of privacy), cert. 
denied sub nom. Rodriguez v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 533 (2011); United States v. 
Goodapple, 958 F.2d 1402, 1409 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding that the attorney-client privilege 
did not attach because the communication was revealed to his attorney and to third persons); 
United States v. Steele, No. 2:10-cr-000148-BLW, 2011 WL 5403076, at *5 (D. Idaho Nov. 
8, 2011) (holding that a prisoner has no reasonable expectation of privacy in recorded calls); 
Comprehensive Habilitation Servs., Inc. v. Commerce Funding Corp., 240 F.R.D. 78, 85 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“[T]here was no privileged communication at which the IRS was 
present.”). 
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nonconfidential.32  For instance, if a client knows her communications with 
her attorney are being recorded, courts have held that there can be no 
reasonable expectation of confidentiality.33 
The confidentiality requirement goes hand in hand with waiver of the 
privilege.34  Though waiver of the privilege may be express or implied,35 
waiver by implication is more common and occurs when the client’s 
conduct is inconsistent with a claim of confidentiality.36  If a client 
communicates with the attorney with a reasonable expectation of privacy, 
but then fails to maintain that confidentiality, the client implicitly waives 
the privilege.37 
In other words, a client waives her attorney-client privilege when she 
discloses confidential information to a third party—regardless of whether 
the client intentionally waived the privilege.38  However, the client does not 
 
 32. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 737 F.2d 94, 102 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (finding that attorney-
client privilege attached where corporate counsel and attorney were seated next to each other 
in first-class on a plane, because there were no other parties to their conversation, they were 
talking in low volumes not likely to be overheard, and the conversation itself dealt with legal 
analysis). 
 33. See supra note 31 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Hatcher, 323 
F.3d 666, 674 (8th Cir. 2003) (“Because the inmates and their lawyers were aware that their 
conversations were being recorded, they could not reasonably expect that their conversations 
would remain private.”); Cody v. Walter, No. Civ. 08-4024, 2008 WL 4543042, at *8 
(D.S.D. Sept. 18, 2008) (“The presence of the recording device was the functional equivalent 
of the presence of a third party.”). 
 34. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Garvey, 109 F.R.D. 323, 327 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (“The 
confidentiality element and waiver are closely related inasmuch as any voluntary disclosure 
inconsistent with the confidential nature of the attorney client relationship waives the 
privilege.”). 
 35. See In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619, 622 (4th Cir. 1988) (“Implied waiver 
nullifies a privilege when disclosure of a privileged communication has vitiated 
confidentiality.”). 
 36. See 2 RICE, supra note 11, § 9:25. 
 37. See Burden-Meeks v. Welch, 319 F.3d 897, 901 (7th Cir. 2003) (“When [the 
municipal body] showed the Mayor a copy of the report, it waived any privilege it 
possesses.”); Nat’l Day Laborer Org. Network v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement 
Agency, 827 F. Supp. 2d 242, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Given the extensive and specific 
evidence produced by plaintiffs showing that the factual information, legal analysis, and 
legal conclusions in the Memorandum have been disclosed to the public, I find that 
[Defendant] has failed to meet its burden of proving that confidentiality was maintained.”); 
Flo Pac, LLC v. NuTech, LLC, No. WDQ-09-510, 2010 WL 5125447, at *7 (D. Md. Dec. 9, 
2010) (noting that “waiver occurs when a privileged communication is disclosed to a third 
party at a later date”). 
 38. See, e.g., Bowne of N.Y.C., Inc. v. AmBase Corp., 150 F.R.D. 465, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 
1993) (“[T]he intent of the party and its attorney not to cause an implied waiver is 
immaterial if they intentionally undertake actions that have the effect of causing such a 
waiver.”); United States v. Betinsky, No. 88-198, 1988 WL 97673, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 20, 
1988) (“Subjective intent is irrelevant if the ‘person fails to take affirmative action and 
institute reasonable precautions’ to protect confidentiality.” (quoting Parkway Gallery 
Furniture, Inc. v. Kittinger/Pa. House Grp., Inc., 116 F.R.D. 46, 50 (M.D.N.C. 1987)), aff’d, 
877 F.2d 58 (3d Cir. 1989); Goldman Sachs & Co. v. Blondis, 412 F. Supp. 286, 288 (N.D. 
Ill. 1976) (“[I]t is a uniform rule that when a party’s conduct reaches a certain point of 
disclosure, fairness requires that the privilege cease, whether or not this is the result 
intended.”). 
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waive the privilege if:  “(1) the disclosure is inadvertent; (2) the holder of 
the privilege or protection took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure; and 
(3) the holder promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the error.”39 
In order to determine whether the client took adequate precautions to 
preserve the confidentiality of the attorney-client communications, courts 
consider the effect and feasibility of preventing disclosure, such as the 
standard stated in Suburban Sew ’N Sweep, Inc. v. Swiss-Bernina, Inc.: 
In determining whether the precautions taken were adequate, two 
considerations are paramount:  (1) the effect on uninhibited consultation 
between attorney and client of not allowing the privilege in these 
circumstances; and (2) the ability of the parties to the communication to 
protect against the disclosures.40 
Therefore, when a client leaves documents in a place accessible to third 
parties without taking measures to maintain their confidentiality,41 or when 
a client leaves papers in a public hallway42 or a table in a hotel room 
occupied by other people,43 the client has implicitly waived the privilege 
because the client failed to take available precautions to retain the 
confidentiality of the written communications. 
Involuntary disclosures will not result in a waiver, however, if the 
responsibility of losing confidentiality lies with someone other than the 
client—such as when documents have been stolen.44  In the criminal 
context, involuntary disclosure of attorney-client communications via 
illegal search or seizure does not affect the defendant’s privilege protection, 
unless the defendant is aware that the communications have been seized.45  
Once the client knows that the privileged communications have been 
seized, courts will place the responsibility back with the client to take all 
reasonable measures to retrieve the communications to retain the 
privilege.46 
 
 39. FED. R. EVID. 502(b). 
 40. Suburban Sew ’N Sweep, Inc. v. Swiss-Bernina, Inc., 91 F.R.D. 254, 260 (N.D. Ill. 
1981). 
 41. See generally In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1973) (where client had left 
documents in accountant’s office). 
 42. See In re Victor, 422 F. Supp. 475, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
 43. See Bower v. Weisman, 669 F. Supp. 602, 605–06 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
 44. See, e.g., Sackman v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 173 F.R.D. 358, 365 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (“The 
assertion of privilege . . . is not waived through public disclosure of a stolen privileged 
document.”); see also Suburban Sew ’N Sweep, Inc., 91 F.R.D. at 260 (“[R]eview of the 
cases, and particularly of the evolving rule with respect to eavesdroppers, reveals that the 
privilege is not simply inapplicable any time that confidentiality is breached, as plaintiffs 
claim, and that the relevant consideration is the intent of the defendants to maintain the 
confidentiality of the documents as manifested in the precautions they took.”). 
 45. See, e.g., United States v. Ofshe, 817 F.2d 1508, 1515–16 (11th Cir. 1987); Bishop 
v. Rose, 701 F.2d 1150, 1156–57 (6th Cir. 1983). 
 46. Compare In re Grand Jury (Impounded), 138 F.3d 978, 983 (3d Cir. 1998) (client 
did not seek judicial intervention to protect adversary from possessing privileged 
communication, and the privilege protection was lost), and United States v. De La Jara, 973 
F.2d 746, 749–50, (9th Cir. 1992) (privilege was waived because the client did not seek 
judicial intervention to stop the prosecution’s use of the privileged communication), with 
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To determine whether the communication remained confidential in fact, 
courts consider not only if the communication was made available to third 
parties but also whether the communications were conducted or created to 
inform a third party.47  Courts must determine whether the client intended 
to relinquish the confidentiality of the communication, which has the effect 
of either making the expectation of confidentiality unreasonable or making 
the communication nonconfidential.48 
d.  Requirement Four:  Made for the Purpose of Obtaining Legal Advice 
The fourth and final element of attorney-client privilege is that a client’s 
confidential communication to his attorney must be “necessary to obtain 
informed legal advice.”49  Courts do not require an express request for legal 
advice.50  While courts consider the lawyer’s role to determine whether a 
communication is comprised of legal advice,51 ultimately the client’s 
intention to obtain legal advice or assistance controls.52 
 
United States v. Western Titanium, Inc., No. 08-CR-4229-JLS, 2010 WL 3789775, at *6 
(S.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2010) (client took actions to retrieve the privileged documents from the 
prosecution and consequently the privilege was not waived). 
 47. See United States v. Ruehle, 583 F.3d 600, 609 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. 
Lawless, 709 F.2d 485, 487 (7th Cir. 1983) (“When information is transmitted to an attorney 
with the intent that the information will be transmitted to a third party . . . such information 
is not confidential.”); United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 540 (5th Cir. 1982); 
United States v. McDonald, 313 F.2d 832, 835 (2d Cir. 1963) (“Only matters transmitted by 
the client that are intended to be confidential communications to his attorney are 
protected.”). 
 48. For example, courts have found no expectation of confidentiality when the attorney-
client communication is prepared for public filings or other publicly published materials. See 
United States v. White, 950 F.2d 426, 430 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding that information disclosed 
for the purpose of assembly into a bankruptcy petition does not have an expectation of 
confidentiality); United States v. Jones, 696 F.2d 1069, 1073 (4th Cir. 1982) (“[A]ppellants 
not only obtained the tax law opinions for the ultimate use of persons other than themselves, 
but also publicized portions of the legal opinions in brochures and other printed material.”). 
 49. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976). 
 50. See, e.g., First Heights Bank, FSB v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 312, 315 (2000) 
(“[I]t is not necessary that the party invoking the privilege expressly request confidential 
legal assistance when that request is implied.”). 
 51. See Texaco P.R., Inc. v. Dep’t of Consumer Affairs, 60 F.3d 867, 884 (1st Cir. 1995) 
(holding that the privilege did not apply where “counsel ceased to function as lawyers and 
began to function as regulators.  Therefore, [the defendant] could not invoke the attorney-
client privilege in connection with the documents at issue.”); SEC v. Credit Bancorp., Ltd., 
51 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 1429, 1430 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding the privilege did not apply 
“because the reports, although prepared by attorneys, are prepared as part of the regular 
business of the company” (internal quotation omitted)); EPSTEIN, supra note 22, at 339–40. 
 52. See United States v. Richey, 632 F.3d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding that the 
district court erred in concluding that the work file was protected by the attorney-client 
privilege because it was not made for the purpose of providing legal advice); United States v. 
Johnston, 146 F.3d 785, 794 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding communications not privileged 
because “[t]he defendant does not point us to . . . any credible evidence in the record that 
demonstrates that the conversations related to legal advice or strategy sought”); Favors v. 
Cuomo, 285 F.R.D. 187, 198 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding that in order for the privilege to 
apply, “the predominant purpose of the communication must be to render or solicit legal 
advice” (internal quotations omitted)). 
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Whether articulated as eight53 or four elements,54 the proponent of the 
privilege must “demonstrate its applicability”;55 if successful, the privilege 
prevents the disclosure of the substance of the communications, continuing 
beyond the death of the client so long as confidentiality is preserved.56  The 
protection is absolute in that it “cannot be overcome simply by a showing of 
need.”57  In other words, the privilege applies regardless of the adversary’s 
or the court’s need for the information contained in the communications.58  
While this may seem like a loss from a truth-seeking standpoint,59 some 
commentators have argued that the communications do not really represent 
a “loss” of evidence because the client would not have made the 
communications without the shield of attorney-client privilege.60 
B.  The Confidentiality Requirement’s Evolution 
This subpart focuses on the confidentiality requirement—first, how it 
evolved to incorporate exceptions that allow the attorney-client privilege to 
retain the goal of promoting client candor; and second, how scholars debate 
confidentiality’s usefulness as a requirement for the privilege to attach. 
The attorney-client privilege evolved over time and the requirement of 
confidentiality has evolved with it.61  Beginning in the early nineteenth 
century, courts began denying the privilege when the communication 
occurred in the presence of third parties.62  Paul Rice, the author of the 
 
 53. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 54. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 55. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 341 F.3d 331, 335 (4th Cir. 2003); see also In re Mentor 
Corp. ObTape Transobturator Sling Prods. Liab. Litig., 632 F. Supp. 2d 1370, 1380 (M.D. 
Ga. 2009) (“Defendant, however, still bears the burden of establishing that the privileged 
documents have remained confidential.”). 
 56. See 1 RICE, supra note 11, §§ 2:1, 2:2, 2:5. 
 57. Martin v. Valley Nat’l Bank of Ariz., 140 F.R.D. 291, 306 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); see also 
Bank Hapoalim, B.M. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., No. 92 Civ. 3561 (KMW), 1993 WL 
37506, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 1993) (“The attorney-client privilege is an absolute 
privilege.”). 
 58. See, e.g., Golden Trade, S.r.L. v. Lee Apparel Co., 143 F.R.D. 514, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 
1992) (“The importance of this principle is underscored by the fact that this privilege, unlike 
most others, is absolute in the sense that it cannot be overcome merely by a showing that the 
information would be extremely helpful to the party seeking disclosure.”). 
 59. See generally Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947) (discussing the balance 
between the search for truth and the need to protect work product or privileged 
communications). 
 60. 1 RICE, supra note 11, § 2:3; see Developments in the Law:  Privileged 
Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1450, 1508 (1985). 
 61. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 62. See, e.g., Basye v. State, 63 N.W. 811, 818 (Neb. 1895) (“Where, at least in the 
absence of fraud and collusion, a client makes statements to his attorney in the presence of a 
third party, such person is not prohibited by statute from testifying to such statement.”); 
People v. Buchanan, 39 N.E. 846, 854 (N.Y. 1895) (“A communication intended to be 
confidential should not be made in the hearing of a third person, unless that person stood in a 
peculiar relation of confidence . . . .  The protection extended by the statute to 
communications between attorney and client is intended to cover those which the relation 
calls for, and are supposed to be confided to the lawyer to guide him in giving his 
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“leading treatise”63 on attorney-client privilege, has argued that the 
confidentiality requirement should be abolished in a return to the early 
conception of the privilege.64  Other commentators have rejected Professor 
Rice’s proposal and insist that confidentiality is an essential requirement of 
attorney-client privilege.65  This subpart first analyzes how exceptions to 
the confidentiality requirement emerged over time to allow the privilege to 
continue to serve its public policy purpose of promoting client candor.  
Second, the subpart addresses arguments for retaining confidentiality as a 
requirement for attorney-client privilege, before considering Professor 
Rice’s position that the confidentiality requirement be abolished. 
1.  Three Exceptions to the Confidentiality Requirement and 
How They Promote Client Candor 
Though attorney-client privilege generally requires strict 
confidentiality,66 the public policy goals of promoting client candor and 
effective representation create circumstances where disclosures to third 
parties do not destroy the privilege.67  There are three broad categories of 
exceptions to the confidentiality requirement:  agents of the attorney or 
client, joint clients, and inadvertent disclosures.68  Each exception is 
addressed below in light of how each promotes the public policy goals of 
encouraging client candor and effective representation.69 
The first exception to the confidentiality requirement is third-party 
agents.  Disclosure to agents of the client or attorney who assist in the 
client’s legal representation does not destroy the privilege.70  Agents of 
attorneys can be either ministerial agents71 or substantive experts who assist 
 
professional aid and advice.  I am not aware of any extension of the rule which would protect 
the revelation of confidences made to a friend, or to a lawyer in the presence of a friend.”). 
 63. Melanie B. Leslie, The Costs of Confidentiality and the Purpose of Privilege, 2000 
WIS. L. REV. 31, 32 (referring to RICE, supra note 11). 
 64. See generally Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege:  The Eroding Concept of 
Confidentiality Should Be Abolished, 47 DUKE L.J. 853 (1998) (arguing that confidentiality 
is an illogical requirement for attorney-client privilege). 
 65. See Leslie, supra note 63, at 33; see also 2 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW 
WIGMORE:  EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES § 6.8 (2d ed. 2010 & Supp. 2013). 
 66. See supra Part I.A.2.c. 
 67. See 2 RICE, supra note 11, § 9:68. 
 68. See 1 id. §§ 3:3, 4:2, 4:31; 2 id. § 9:72. 
 69. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 70. See 1 RICE, supra note 11, §§ 3:3, 4:2; see also EPSTEIN, supra note 22, at 258. 
 71. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Edney v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038, 1046–47 
(E.D.N.Y. 1976) (“Given the complexities of modern existence few, if any, lawyers could as 
a practical matter represent the interests of their clients without the assistance of a variety of 
trained legal associates not yet admitted to the bar, clerks, typists, messengers, and similar 
aides. ‘The assistance of these agents being indispensable to his work and the 
communications of the client being often necessarily committed to them by the attorney or 
by the client himself, the privilege must include all the persons who act as the attorney’s 
agents.’” (quoting 8 WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 2301, at 583)), aff’d sub nom., Edney v. 
Smith, 556 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1977). 
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the attorney in representation.72  To qualify as an agent, the relationship 
must meet the fundamental requirements of agency.73  Attorney-client 
privilege may attach to a communication made between the agent and the 
attorney or client, or to a communication made between the attorney or 
client in the presence of an agent.74  By expanding the circle of 
confidentiality beyond the client and the attorney, courts promote the public 
policy goal of encouraging effective legal representation; without such an 
exception for agents, it would be difficult or “occasionally impossible” for a 
single attorney to render adequate legal representation.75  In other words, an 
expanded concept of confidentiality that encompasses agents of the attorney 
and client allows a client to communicate candidly with her entire legal 
representation team; otherwise, the attorney would be forced to personally 
perform all acts of the representation, curtailing the effectiveness of the 
representation.76  Because attorneys often need agents to assist in 
representation, clients must trust that their communications with the agents 
remain privileged, and thus the privilege continues to promote its goal of 
encouraging client candor.77 
The second exception to the confidentiality requirement is when multiple 
clients share a common interest and are represented by the same attorney 
simultaneously.78  Courts have designated this joint client scenario as an 
“exception”79 or an “extension”80 of the confidentiality requirement.  
 
 72. See United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921 (2d Cir. 1961) (“We cannot regard the 
privilege as confined to ‘menial or ministerial’ employees. Thus, we can see no significant 
difference between a case where the attorney sends a client speaking a foreign language to 
an interpreter to make a literal translation of the client’s story . . . .”); United States v. 
Singhal, 842 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2011) (“[T]he attorney-client privilege may be 
preserved even when confidential communications are disclosed to a third party—such as an 
investment banker—as long as the third party is serving an ‘interpretive function’ to aid the 
lawyer in helping the client.”). 
 73. See Henderson v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 113 F.R.D. 502, 509 (N.D. Ill. 1986) 
(reciting the three requirements of agency as the power to affect legal relations, a fiduciary 
relationship, and the principle’s right to the control the agent’s conduct). 
 74. See 1 RICE, supra note 11, § 3:3. 
 75. See id. 
 76. See Kovel, 296 F.2d at 922 (“[T]here can be no more virtue in requiring the lawyer 
to sit by while the client pursues these possibly tedious preliminary conversations with the 
accountant than in insisting on the lawyer’s physical presence while the client dictates a 
statement to the lawyer’s secretary or is interviewed by a clerk not yet admitted to 
practice.”). 
 77. See id. at 923 (finding that the need to determine where the agency line is drawn is 
necessary “if the privilege is neither to be unduly expanded nor to become a trap”). 
 78. See Hanson v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 372 F.3d 286, 292 (4th Cir. 2004) 
(“Described as an extension of the attorney client privilege, the common interest doctrine 
applies when two or more parties consult or retain an attorney concerning a legal matter in 
which they share a common interest.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 79. See Cavallaro v. United States, 284 F.3d 236, 250 (1st Cir. 2002) (“The common-
interest doctrine, like the rule announced in Kovel, is not an independent basis for privilege, 
but an exception to the general rule that the attorney-client privilege is waived when 
privileged information is disclosed to a third party.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 80. See, e.g., United States v. Henke, 222 F.3d 633, 637 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that the 
joint defense privilege is an extension of the attorney-client privilege); Griffith v. Davis, 161 
F.R.D. 687, 691 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (same). 
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Similar to the exception for agents, courts began allowing an exception for 
joint clients because the exception keeps the privilege in line with its public 
policy goal of promoting client candor.81  Individuals with shared legal 
interests can pool information and make disclosures in the presence of their 
co-clients that they would not have made but for the sake of securing 
effective legal representation.82 
A third exception to the privilege’s confidentiality requirement is when a 
client involuntarily discloses the communication to a third party.83  When a 
disclosure is inadvertent, courts are reluctant to allow a strict confidentiality 
requirement to trump the public policy of encouraging open 
communications between clients and attorneys.84  Courts consider fact-
specific circumstances such as the precautions the parties took to prevent 
disclosure, the volume of discovery, the time pressure of discovery, the 
extent of the disclosures, the time to rectify the disclosures, and overriding 
issues of fairness.85  However, courts “overwhelmingly recognize[]” the 
privilege when the disclosure was inadvertent.86  These courts seek to avoid 
instilling fear in clients that a mistaken disclosure will mean admissibility, 
because that may chill future attorney-client communications.87 
In sum, the justification for allowing confidentiality to include third-party 
agents, joint defense clients, and involuntary disclosures is the same as the 
goals of attorney-client privilege itself:  promoting client candor and 
effective representation.88  The confidentiality requirement, like the 
privilege itself, has developed pragmatically in response to attempts to find 
 
 81. See 1 RICE, supra note 11, § 4:30; supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 82. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated November 16, 1974, 406 F. 
Supp. 381, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (“[I]t may reasonably be inferred that resultant disclosures 
are intended to be insulated from exposure beyond the confines of the group; that inference, 
supported by a demonstration that the disclosures would not have been made but for the sake 
of securing, advancing, or supplying legal representation, will give sufficient force to a 
subsequent claim to the privilege.”).  In addition to the public policy goal of promoting client 
candor and effective legal advice, the joint defense exception to confidentiality serves an 
additional policy goal of saving attorneys’ and courts’ resources by expediting the trial 
preparation process. See United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1337 (7th Cir. 1979) 
(“Cooperation between defendants in such circumstances is often not only in their own best 
interests but serves to expedite the trial or, as in the case at bar, the trial preparation.”). 
 83. See supra notes 39–43 and accompanying text.  Rule 502(b) of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence codifies the inadvertent disclosure exception that courts recognized at common 
law: 
When made in a federal proceeding or to a federal office or agency, the disclosure 
does not operate as a waiver in a federal or state proceeding if:  (1) the disclosure 
is inadvertent; (2) the holder of the privilege or protection took reasonable steps to 
prevent disclosure; and (3) the holder promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the 
error. 
FED. R. EVID. 502(b). 
 84. See 2 RICE, supra note 11, § 9.79. 
 85. See id. § 9.73. 
 86. Paul R. Rice, A Bad Idea Dying Hard:  A Reply to Professor Leslie’s Defense of the 
Indefensible, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 187, 196. 
 87. See 2 RICE, supra note 11, § 9.73. 
 88. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
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a balance between truth-seeking and promoting client candor.89  In part 
because courts have curtailed the rigidity of the confidentiality requirement 
with these exceptions, certain scholars debate whether confidentiality is a 
“logical imperative” of the privilege at all.90  The following subparts 
explore the two sides of this debate. 
2.  Arguments for Confidentiality As a Requirement 
for the Privilege To Attach 
When Professor Wigmore first developed the confidentiality requirement 
around the turn of the nineteenth century,91 his theory was that there would 
be no need to provide the incentive of the privilege if the client is otherwise 
willing to let others know what he has told the lawyer.92  More recent 
proponents of the confidentiality requirement advance two additional 
arguments:  first, that confidentiality serves as a useful limitation on the 
scope of the privilege, and second, that requiring confidentiality reduces 
litigation costs. 
The primary justification for confidentiality—that confidentiality serves 
as a limitation to ensure that it applies only to those statements that would 
not have been made without the privilege—is an extension of Professor 
Wigmore’s conceptualization of confidentiality93: 
The attorney-client privilege does not seek to encourage attorney-client 
communication at any price.  Rather, scholars and courts adjudicating 
privilege issues have long struggled with the tension between the need for 
the privilege and the substantial cost of shielding relevant evidence from 
the fact finder . . . .  The confidentiality requirement . . . seeks to ensure 
that the privilege protects only those attorney-client communications that 
would not have been made absent the privilege.94 
In other words, the requirement of confidentiality serves as a limiting 
function that helps to balance the court’s “truth-seeking process” with the 
privilege’s goal of encouraging client candor.95  Confidentiality has thus 
been characterized as a “useful bright line limitation.”96 
As Professor Leslie has argued, a secondary argument for keeping 
confidentiality as a requirement for the privilege is that eliminating the 
requirement would increase litigation costs.97  First, the confidentiality 
 
 89. See EPSTEIN, supra note 22, at 6–8. 
 90. See 1 RICE, supra note 11, § 6:4 (“Confidentiality is not the logical imperative it has 
been presumed to be.”). 
 91. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 2285, at 531 (“The communications must originate 
in a confidence that they will not be disclosed.”); Rice, supra note 64, at 869–70. 
 92. 24 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE:  EVIDENCE § 5484, at 176, 318, 343 (1986). 
 93. See 2 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 65, § 6.8. 
 94. Leslie, supra note 63, at 35–36 (emphasis omitted) (citing 8 WIGMORE, supra note 
20, §§ 2292, 2311). 
 95. See id. at 84. 
 96. Rice, supra note 86, at 187 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 97. See Leslie, supra note 63, at 77. 
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requirement allows courts to rule out the privilege in most cases when a 
third party is present, and without that threshold determination, courts 
would be forced to expend more resources scrutinizing the content of the 
privilege.98  Second, if abolished, the lack of confidentiality requirement 
may incentivize clients to hire lawyers to participate in communications in 
an attempt to attach privilege claims.99  Third, abolishing the confidentiality 
requirement would cause more cases to proceed to trial because the 
requirement tends to limit the application of the privilege and increase the 
information each party has about the other’s case.100 
Taken together, proponents of maintaining the confidentiality 
requirement emphasize that it serves as an important limitation on the 
privilege101 that saves litigation expenses.102 
3.  Arguments for Eliminating Confidentiality As a 
Requirement for the Privilege 
In his treatise on attorney-client privilege, Professor Rice argues that it 
has “never been satisfactorily explained” why “the law has linked the 
recognition of this privilege to a confidentiality requirement.”103  Rice first 
notes that no case prior to the end of the eighteenth century contemplated 
confidentiality as a requirement of attorney-client privilege.104  Identifying 
confidentiality as a uniquely twentieth century invention,105 Rice has 
formulated several arguments for returning to the privilege’s pre–nineteenth 
century roots by abolishing confidentiality as a privilege requirement.106 
First, Professor Rice argues that confidentiality does not serve the 
privilege’s goal of promoting openness between an attorney and client.107  
Rice argues that the privilege serves a broader purpose even when the client 
has no intention of confidentiality:  if the client does not seek 
confidentiality, requiring it does not encourage client candor.108  But if the 
client does seek confidentiality while communicating with her attorney, the 
attorney can create a confidential condition per the client’s wishes—which 
does not necessarily mean that every communication with every client 
should require confidentiality to be privileged.109 
 
 98. See id. 
 99. See id. 
 100. See id. 
 101. See, e.g., United States v. Tellier, 255 F.2d 441, 447 (2d Cir. 1958) (“It is of the 
essence of the attorney-client privilege that it is limited to those communications which are 
intended to be confidential.”). 
 102. Leslie, supra note 63, at 84. 
 103. 1 RICE, supra note 11, § 6:1. 
 104. See id. § 6:3. 
 105. See PAUL R. RICE, ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE:  LAW AND PRACTICE 196–97 (2004) 
(explaining how Professor Wigmore invented the confidentiality requirement). 
 106. See generally Rice, supra note 64. 
 107. See id. at 857. 
 108. See id. at 860. 
 109. See id. (“The fact that secrecy may be desired is not justification for making it 
required.”). 
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Second, Professor Rice argues that because the requirement has never 
been justified in light of the purpose of the privilege,110 courts have carved 
out so many exceptions to the requirement that it is no longer useful or 
relevant.111  Due to the exceptions to strict confidentiality,112 Rice argues 
that confidentiality has complicated the waiver doctrine and lost its 
meaning.113 
Professor Rice’s final argument is identical to one of the proponents’ 
arguments—that abolishing the confidentiality requirement would reduce 
litigation costs.114  In support of this cost argument, Rice highlights ways in 
which a court’s process for determining confidentiality is “complex.”115  
First, for each contested communication, the client must produce evidence 
that he intended the communication to be confidential;116 second, the client 
must produce evidence that the nature of the relationship of the parties is 
covered by the expanded confidentiality doctrine;117 and third, the court 
must determine that confidentiality has been maintained.118  Given these 
complex and costly evidentiary proceedings, Rice concludes that the cost of 
continuing to maintain a confidentiality requirement is not justified given 
that the requirement does not serve the purpose of the privilege.119 
In sum, certain privilege scholars debate whether confidentiality should 
be retained as a requirement for attorney-client privilege to attach to a 
communication.  The next subpart introduces the types of information that 
employers monitor to understand how such monitoring gives rise to a 
confidentiality dilemma and therefore an attorney-client privilege problem. 
C.  Employer Monitoring of Employee Communications 
In a time before email, the Supreme Court in O’Connor v. Ortega 
considered an employee’s expectation of privacy in the workplace.120  The 
O’Connor Court emphasized that the interests of employers to search 
workplace property must be balanced against the employee’s right to 
privacy in personal items brought to the workplace.121  Despite holding that 
the employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy, the Court noted that 
 
 110. See id. at 859 (“Throughout both English and U.S. history, however, not a single 
reported decision can be found in which a court has either explicated this reasoning or 
questioned its logic.”). 
 111. Id. at 874–88. 
 112. See supra Part I.B.1 (categorizing three exceptions to a strict confidentiality 
requirement as agents, joint clients, and inadvertent disclosure). 
 113. See Rice, supra note 86, at 198. 
 114. See Leslie, supra note 63, at 32–33. 
 115. See Rice, supra note 64, at 861, 868. 
 116. Id. at 861–62. 
 117. Id. at 862. 
 118. Id. at 863. 
 119. See id. at 868. 
 120. 480 U.S. 709, 715–17 (1987) (finding a reasonable expectation of privacy when a 
doctor’s private office was searched by state officials who seized personal items that were 
later used in disciplinary proceedings). 
 121. See id. at 716. 
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“employees’ expectations of privacy in their offices, desks, and file cabinets 
. . . may be reduced by virtue of actual office practices and procedures, or 
by legitimate regulation.”122 
Today, courts face a similar question, but instead of a personal item 
tucked away in an employer-owned desk, courts grapple with whether an 
employee has a reasonable expectation of confidentiality in personal emails 
given “actual office practices and procedures” of employer monitoring.123  
Approximately 92 percent of adult internet users use email, 61 percent of 
whom use email on a typical day.124  Now that a majority of employment 
settings provide employees with access to email,125 a majority of employees 
with internet access spend at least some time during the workday on 
nonwork-related online activities.126  The rise in non-work-related online 
usage has been accompanied by employers’ monitoring of their employees’ 
computer use.127  Statistics on the prevalence of employer monitoring tend 
to show that 50 to 75 percent of employers monitor electronic 
communications transmitted in the workplace.128  Though policies differ in 
scope, some employers monitor every single email sent or received by 
employees.129 
Employers can monitor an employee’s computer usage in several 
ways.130  The various monitoring techniques allow employers not only to 
monitor all incoming and outgoing messages at home and on webmail but 
 
 122. Id. at 717. 
 123. See id. 
 124. Kristen Purcell, Search and Email Still Top the List of Most Popular Online 
Activities, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, 2 (Aug 9, 2011), http://www.pewinternet.org/
~/media//Files/Reports/2011/PIP_Search-and-Email.pdf. 
 125. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EMPLOYEE PRIVACY:  COMPUTER USE MONITORING 
PRACTICES AND POLICIES OF SELECTED COMPANIES (Sept. 2002), available at http://www.gao
.gov/new.items/d02717.pdf. 
 126. Websense’s Seventh Annual Web@Work Survey Explores Leading Trends in 
Employee Computing for 2006, WEBSENSE (May 17, 2006), http://investor.websense
.com/common/mobile/iphone/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=285092&CompanyID=WBSN&
mobileid= (finding that the average time spent accessing the internet at work is 12.81 hours 
per week and the average time accessing nonwork related websites at work is 3.06 hours per 
week). 
 127. L. CAMILLE HEBERT, EMPLOYEE PRIVACY LAW § 8A:1, at 5 (2006) (“An increasingly 
common method of electronic monitoring chosen by employers is monitoring of the work of 
employees through computers.”); Kara R. Williams, Protecting What You Thought Was 
Yours:  Expanding Employee Privacy To Protect the Attorney-Client Privilege from 
Employer Computer Monitoring, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 347, 350 (2008) (“Employers’ monitoring 
of their employees’ computer use is extremely common in American businesses.”). 
 128. Am. Mgmt. Ass’n & the e-Pol’y Inst., 2005 Electronic Monitoring & Surveillance 
Survey, E-POL’Y INST., http://www.epolicyinstitute.com/survey2005Summary.pdf (last 
visited Apr. 19, 2013) (reporting that as many as 76 percent of employers monitor their 
employees’ computer use); Am. Mgmt. Ass’n, 2003 E-mail Rules Policies, and Practice 
Survey, E-POL’Y INST. (May 14, 2003), http://www.epolicyinstitute.com/survey/survey.pdf 
(reporting that more than 50 percent of companies monitor employee email). 
 129. See Villano, supra note 1. 
 130. See generally Louise L. Hill, Gone but Not Forgotten:  When Privacy, Policy and 
Privilege Collide, 9 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 565 (2011).  The technical aspects of 
employer monitoring are outside the scope of this Note. 
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can also allow employers to monitor employees’ personal passwords and 
unsent messages by recording employees’ keystrokes.131 
Employers are legally permitted to monitor employees’ online 
communications.132  Employers monitor emails at work for several 
reasons133:  employers have a right to protect themselves from theft or 
misuse of the employers’ resources;134 employers may seek to reduce their 
legal liability or ensure legal compliance;135 and in other instances, 
employers monitor employee communications to protect their assets and 
promote employee productivity.136  Because employers can legally monitor 
all communications, this includes communications with private 
attorneys.137  Whatever the employer’s reason to justify monitoring, courts 
have consistently upheld an employer’s legal right to monitor its 
employees’ communications.138 
D.  Past Scholarship Has Argued That Lawyers or Employers Should 
Prevent Monitored Electronic Communications from 
Losing Privilege Status 
As employer monitoring became more prevalent, scholars started to 
consider how lawyers or employers could reduce the likelihood that 
 
 131. For an overview of three ways in which employers monitor employees’ email 
communications, including keystroke monitoring, see Marc A. Sherman, Webmail at Work:  
The Case for Protection Against Employer Monitoring, 23 TOURO L. REV. 647, 661–63 
(2007). 
 132. 18 U.S.C. § 2701 makes it a crime to “intentionally access without authorization a 
facility through which an electronic communication service is provided” except when 
applied “to conduct authorized . . . by the person or entity providing a wire or electronic 
communications service.” 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2006).  Because employers provide the 
electronic communication service, the exception applies to them. 
 133. See, e.g, TBG Ins. Servs. Corp. v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 155, 162 (Ct. 
App. 2002) (listing reasons companies engage in monitoring practices as including legal 
compliance, legal liability, performance review, productivity measures, and security 
concerns). 
 134. HERBERT, supra note 127, § 8A:1, at 5. 
 135. See Micah Echols, Striking a Balance Between Employer Business Interests and 
Employee Privacy:  Using Respondeat Superior To Justify the Monitoring of Web-Based, 
Personal Electronic Mail Accounts of Employees in the Workplace, 7 COMP. L. REV. & 
TECH. J. 273, 278 (2003); see also Hanson v. First Nat’l Bank, No. 5:10-0906, 2011 WL 
5201430, at *2 (S.D. W. Va. Oct. 31, 2011) (“First National Bank also needs to be able to 
respond to proper requests resulting from legal proceedings that call for electronically stored 
evidence.”). 
 136. Sherman, supra note 131, at 658–60. 
 137. The use of email among attorneys to communicate with clients is widespread. See 
Williams, supra note 127, at 352.  Attorneys have endorsed email technology, and the 
American Bar Association (ABA) has approved this method of communication as well. See 
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 11-459 (2011) (“[A] lawyer 
may transmit information relating to the representation of a client by unencrypted e-mail sent 
over the Internet without violating the [Model Rules of Professional Conduct] . . . because 
the mode of transmission affords a reasonable expectation of privacy from a technological 
and legal standpoint.”). 
 138. See, e.g., Hanson, 2011 WL 5201430, at *2 (“First National Bank must, and does, 
maintain the right and the ability to enter any of these systems and to inspect and review any 
and all data recorded on those systems.”). 
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employees communicating with their attorney at work would lose attorney-
client privilege.  This section summarizes this line of scholarship. 
Since the early days of email, scholars and commentators have warned 
that lawyers must be cautious about communicating with their clients over 
email because of the risk that the communications are monitored,139 and 
therefore may be nonconfidential and nonprivileged.140  Scholars who have 
considered attorney-client privilege in the workplace context argue that 
lawyers should prevent sensitive, nonprivileged communications from 
occurring in the first place or that employers should prevent themselves 
from reading otherwise-privileged communications. 
Though commentators differ in how far they think a lawyer must go to 
prevent potentially nonprivileged communications from occurring; they 
argue that, at minimum, a lawyer must take reasonable precautions,141 view 
electronic modes of communication with their clients with heightened 
scrutiny,142 or not presume email to be secure.143 
In 2011, the American Bar Association’s (ABA) Standing Committee on 
Ethics and Professional Responsibility issued a Formal Opinion entitled 
“Duty to Protect the Confidentiality of E-mail Communications with One’s 
Client.”144  The ABA argued that a lawyer choosing to communicate with a 
client via electronic means “must warn the client about the risk of sending 
or receiving electronic communications . . . to which a third party may gain 
access.”145  Because of the ethical ramifications of the risk that the 
communications are nonprivileged, the ABA argues that lawyers have a 
duty to warn the client to prevent nonprivileged communications from 
 
 139. See, e.g., Jonathan Rose, E-mail Security Risks:  Taking Hacks at the Attorney-Client 
Privilege, 23 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 179, 225 (1997) (“[A]ttorneys must address 
the significant security threat that accompanies e-mail; otherwise, the confidentiality that 
supports the attorney-client privilege may be destroyed.”). 
 140. See, e.g., John M. Barkett, The Challenge of Electronic Communications:  Privilege, 
Privacy, and Other Myths, 38 LITIG., Fall 2011, at 17; Anne Klinefelter, When To Research 
Is To Reveal:  The Growing Threat to Attorney and Client Confidentiality from Online 
Tracking, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 22–29 (2011); Megan E. McEnroe, E-mail in Attorney-
Client Communications:  A Survey of Significant Developments April 2009–June 2010, 66 
BUS. LAW. 191, 192–93 (2010); Dion Messer, To:  Client@workplace.com:  Privilege at 
Risk?, 23 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 75, 92–95 (2004); Williams, supra note 137, 
at 389–90. 
 141. Klinefelter, supra note 140, at 30 (noting that in the online tracking context, “courts 
should encourage precautions that secure a balance between effectiveness and 
manageability, and attorneys should take care to identify and implement reasonable 
precautions”); Messer, supra note 140, at 76 (“[A] prudent attorney should consider 
implementing some precautionary measures to protect his client from losing the privilege 
and confidentiality of e-mail correspondence.”). 
 142. McEnroe, supra note 140, at 196 (“Recent court decisions, spawned by the 
boundless pace of technology, require that lawyers regard the methods and means for client 
communication with a heightened sense of scrutiny.”). 
 143. Barkett, supra note 140, at 19 (“[Lawyers] should never assume that attorney-client 
email exchanges from a client’s work computer are secure even when communications occur 
through the client’s password-protected personal email account.”). 
 144. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 11-459 (2011). 
 145. Id. at 4. 
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occurring in the first place.146  If a client fails to heed the attorney’s caution, 
the ABA instructed that the lawyer’s duty requires him or her to cease 
sending messages to the client.147  Following an American Law Institute 
and ABA Continuing Legal Education program, one participant proposed 
sample language that an attorney should incorporate into his or her 
representation agreement wherein the client would agree to “NEVER” 
communicate via company-owned devices.148 
Other commentators have focused not on the lawyers’ duty, but instead 
argue that employers should take precautions not to read employees’ 
communications with their private attorneys after they have been monitored 
or recorded.149  The burden would thus be on the employer to limit its 
review of recorded materials to those that it knows to be nonprivileged; 
then, the employer should seek outside legal advice or place the 
communications before a court to decide whether they are in fact 
privileged.150  These two arguments—that lawyers should prevent 
monitored communications and that employers should prevent themselves 
from reading attorney-client communications—are not mutually exclusive. 
Part I of this Note has focused on the history and elements of attorney-
client privilege, its confidentiality requirement, and employer monitoring of 
employee communications.  To summarize, past scholarship has argued that 
lawyers or employers should prevent monitored attorney-client 
communications from occurring or becoming nonprivileged.  But given that 
attorney-client communications are monitored, courts must determine when 
the privilege should attach to a communication notwithstanding that the 
employer monitored the employee’s communication.  Part II analyzes three 
different approaches that courts have used or commentators have proposed 
 
 146. See id. at 3–4. 
 147. See id. at 4 n.7.  For an example of a state that has endorsed and adopted the ABA’s 
approach, see Mark M. Iba, Warning:  This Email May Be Monitored or Recorded, 81 J. 
KAN. B. ASS’N, March 2012, at 11. 
 148. Robert B. Fitzpatrick, Company-Issued Equipment and Waivers of Privilege, ALI-
CLE, 273 (Oct. 17, 2011), http://files.ali-cle.org/thumbs/datastorage/skoobesruoc/pdf
/VCT1017_chapter_09_thumb.pdf (“Therefore, you should NEVER communicate by e-mail 
with your attorney using a company-owned computer or other company-owned electronic 
device or using your business e-mail address . . . .  Client should provide Firm with an email 
address, other than employer’s, for communication between the Firm and Client.”). 
 149. See Marjorie J. Peerce & Daniel V. Shapiro, The Increasing Privacy Expectations in 
Employees’ Personal Email, 13 J. INTERNET L., no. 8, 2010, at 1; John K. Villa, Emails 
Between Employees and Their Attorneys Using Company Computers:  Are They Still 
Privileged?, ACC DOCKET, Apr. 2008, available at http://www.wc.com/assets/attachments
/EP_(5).pdf. 
 150. See Peerce & Shapiro, supra note 149, at 20 (“[A]n employer is on safer ground 
when it remains within the boundaries of traditionally accepted practice and limits its review 
to non-privileged material accessible in the memory of the company’s computers when its 
electronic communications policy provides authorization for such action.  Even if a company 
has a novel electronic communications policy that explicitly allows for the use of login 
information or review of attorney-client communications, it should seek outside legal advice 
before acting in the present climate of uncertainty.”); Villa, supra note 149, at 104 (“[O]ne 
option is to hold onto the emails, not read them, and place the issue before the court for 
decision.”). 
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to determine whether attorney-client privilege should attach to an employer-
monitored communication. 
II.  COURTS’ AND COMMENTATORS’ APPROACHES TO WHETHER 
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE SHOULD ATTACH TO COMMUNICATIONS 
MONITORED BY THE CLIENT’S EMPLOYER 
Courts have consistently held that an employer can override an 
employee’s expectation of privacy or confidentiality by instituting a policy 
that e-communications are monitored by the employer.151  However, courts 
and commentators have diverged in their analyses as to whether clients 
retain or lose attorney-client privilege by communicating with their 
attorneys while being monitored by their employer.  Part II categorizes the 
approaches in three sections:  in the first approach, the communication is 
privileged only if the employee’s expectation of confidentiality is 
objectively reasonable; in the second approach, the attorney-client 
communication is never privileged because the employer monitoring 
destroys confidentiality; and in the third approach, the attorney-client 
communication is privileged because confidentiality is not required for the 
privilege.152 
A.  Approach One:  The Objective Reasonableness of the Employee’s 
Expectation of Confidentiality Dictates Whether the Monitored 
Communication Is Privileged 
The first approach that courts use to determine whether an employer-
monitored communication is privileged is the test derived from the Fourth 
Amendment expectation of privacy analysis.153  The court in In re Asia 
Global Crossing took stock of judicial decisions that discussed the 
reasonableness of employees’ expectation of privacy154 and produced a 
four-factor test:   
(1) does the corporation maintain a policy banning personal or other 
objectionable use, (2) does the company monitor the use of the 
employee’s computer or e-mail, (3) do third parties have a right of access 
 
 151. See Muick v. Glenayre Elecs., 280 F.3d 741, 743 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Glenayre had 
announced that it could inspect the laptops that it furnished for the use of its employees, and 
this destroyed any reasonable expectation of privacy that Muick might have had . . . .”); 
United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2000) (“[E-mail monitoring] policy 
placed employees on notice that they could not reasonably expect that their Internet activity 
would be private.”); In re Reserve Fund Sec. & Derivative Litig., 275 F.R.D. 154, 163 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“[B]ecause RMCI’s email policy bans personal use of the RMCI email 
system, this factor weighs in favor of finding that [the defendant] had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the emails he sent to his wife over that system . . . .”). 
 152. Courts sometimes use the word “privacy” interchangeably with “confidentiality.”  
This section adheres to each court’s language. 
 153. See supra notes 8–10 and accompanying text. 
 154. The court drew upon the analysis of five previous decisions that had found no 
reasonable expectation of privacy and three previous decisions that had found a reasonable 
expectation of privacy across both state and federal courts.  See In re Asia Global Crossing, 
Ltd., 322 B.R. 247, 257 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
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to the computer or e-mails, and (4) did the corporation notify the 
employee, or was the employee aware, of the use and monitoring 
policies?155   
If the answer to some or all of these questions is affirmative, then courts 
may find that the employer effectively diminished its employees’ 
expectation of privacy—and as a result, there can be no attorney-client 
privilege because the confidentiality requirement has not been met.156  This 
subpart examines cases in which courts held the employee had an 
objectively reasonable expectation of confidentiality, and then analyzes 
cases in which courts held that the employee did not have an objectively 
reasonable expectation of confidentiality. 
1.  Courts Finding the Privilege Intact Because the Employees Had an 
Objectively Reasonable Expectation of Confidentiality 
A noninsignificant number of courts have concluded that employers’ 
electronic monitoring policies did not destroy the attorney-client privilege.  
The case that created the objective reasonableness test, Asia Global 
Crossing, is one example where the attorney-client privilege remained 
intact.157  Before outlining the four factors, the court established two 
assumptions:  first, the court assumed that the employees’ emails would be 
otherwise privileged if not for an unreasonable expectation of privacy, and 
relatedly, the court assumed that the employees subjectively intended the 
communications to be confidential.158  Turning to its four-factor test, the 
court first determined that the corporation did maintain a policy banning 
personal use.159  Second, the court could not explicitly determine that the 
employer actually monitored emails.160  Third, the court determined that the 
company or anyone with access to the company’s email system had access 
to the employee emails because they were sent and stored on the company’s 
servers.161  Fourth, the court found no convincing evidence that the 
 
 155. See id. 
 156. See supra Part I.A.2.c. 
 157. See supra notes 8–10 and accompanying text. 
 158. In re Asia Global Crossing, 322 B.R. at 258. (“[T]he Court assumes that the Insider 
E-mails are otherwise privileged, and further, that the Insiders subjectively intended that they 
be confidential.”). 
 159. Id. at 260 (“Privacy of these messaging systems is not guaranteed, nor implied.  It is 
the responsibility of every authorized user to be aware of, and comply with, all corporate 
policy and guidelines while using messaging systems.  All data and content on these 
messaging systems is the property of the Company.  No content on these messaging systems 
shall be withheld from the Company’s authorized security personnel or others specifically 
authorized by the chief executive officer of the Company.” (emphasis in original)).  The 
court noted that sending a message over the company’s email system was “like placing a 
copy of that message in the company files.” Id. at 259. 
 160. See id. at 260.  Each of the Insiders submitted statements that the company did not 
monitor employee emails. Id. 
 161. Id. at 259 (“Asia Global clearly had access to its own servers and any other part of 
the system where e-mail messages were stored . . . .”). 
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employer had warned the employees of its email policy.162  Taking these 
four factors together, the court called the evidence “equivocal” and held that 
it was “unable to conclude as a matter of law that the [employees’] use of 
Asia Global’s e-mail system to communicate with their personal attorney 
eliminated any otherwise existing attorney-client privilege.”163  In short, the 
court paired an initial assumption of the privilege with a novel four-factor 
expectation of confidentiality test, and held that merely communicating on a 
monitored work email did not destroy attorney-client privilege.164 
In a case decided concurrently with Asia Global Crossing, a California 
state appellate court found that documents prepared for an attorney in a 
password-protected folder on an employer-issued laptop were protected by 
attorney-client privilege because the employee’s expectation of 
confidentiality was objectively reasonable.165  In preparation for a rape trial, 
the prosecutor seized the defendant’s employer-issued laptop and collected 
all correspondence authored by the defendant pursuant to a subpoena.166  
When the prosecutor found fourteen files in a password-protected folder 
marked “Attorney,” the prosecutor sought and received the password from 
the employer.167  The prosecutor argued that the files left on the laptop with 
a password known only by the defendant and his wife were “left in, 
basically, a public area . . . [and] cannot be privileged.”168  The trial court 
agreed and held that the documents were not privileged.169 
By stating at the outset that there is a presumption of the privilege,170 the 
appellate court began its analysis in a manner similar to Asia Global 
Crossing.171  The court then cited three factors that convinced the court that 
 
 162. See id. (noting that employees asserted that no policy on use and monitoring was 
enacted or enforced). 
 163. Id. at 261. 
 164. See id. at 261–62. 
 165. People v. Jiang, 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d 184, 207–08 (Ct. App. 2005). 
 166. See id. at 198  (noting that the prosecutor sought an English language document for 
the purported purpose of obtaining evidence of the defendant’s ability to communicate in 
English). 
 167. Id. at 201 (“When [the employer] supplied the prosecutor with the password, [the 
employer’s] attorney believed that the documents would only be released by court order if 
they were found not to be privileged.”). 
 168. Id.  The prosecutor pointed to the defendant’s company policy, signed by employees, 
which waived the employee’s expectation of privacy:  “I understand that I have no 
expectation of privacy in the voicemail and electronic mail provided to me by the Company 
or in any property situated on the Company’s premises and/or owned by the Company, 
including disks and other storage media, filing cabinets or other work areas.  I further 
understand that such property, including voice mail and electronic mail, is subject to 
inspection by Company personnel at any time.” Id. at 197–98. 
 169. Id. at 201 (quoting the trial court’s decision, which concluded that “the court 
concludes that the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in said 
documents, any privileges that existed were waived by the defendant’s own conduct”). 
 170. See id. at 203 (“[T]he communication is presumed to have been made in confidence 
and the opponent of the claim of privilege has the burden of proof to establish that the 
communication was not confidential.” (citation omitted)). 
 171. See In re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd., 322 B.R. 247, 258 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(“[T]he Court assumes that the Insider E-mails are otherwise privileged, and further, that the 
Insiders subjectively intended that they be confidential.”). 
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the employee had an objectively reasonable expectation of confidentiality in 
the files:  First, the employment agreement did not suggest that the 
employer would access files that were “clearly segregated as personal and 
password-protected.”172  Second, the purpose of the employer’s policy was 
not to invade the privacy of its employees, but rather to protect the 
employer’s intellectual property.173  Third, the defendant did not waive the 
privilege because the defendant could have believed that he had reserved a 
claim of privilege.174  Thus, the California state court used an analysis that 
paralleled the Asia Global Crossing test in that it considered the nature and 
circumstances of the employer’s written monitoring policy; but the 
California court went further in considering the purpose of the policy.175  
The courts reached similar conclusions between technically nonconfidential 
emails and technically nonconfidential documents, holding that each 
employee’s expectation of confidentiality was reasonable in spite of an 
employer’s ability to monitor such emails and files.176 
The Eastern District of New York reached a similar conclusion in Curto 
v. Medical World Communications, Inc., where the plaintiff was the former 
employee and the defendant was the former employer.177  The employer 
had an “Email/Computer Privacy Policy” that the employee had signed, 
stating that “[e]mployees should not have an expectation of privacy in 
anything they create, store, send, or receive on the computer system.”178  
The employee, who had worked on company-owned computers at home, 
had deleted personal files prior to returning the computers.179  However, the 
former employer hired a forensic consultant that restored portions of the 
files and emails, including documents that the plaintiff’s attorney contended 
were covered by attorney-client privilege.180  The magistrate judge had held 
that the plaintiff did not waive her attorney-client privilege because the 
defendant had never enforced its computer usage policy.181  Noting that the 
Asia Global Crossing test recognizes enforcement as a factor to consider, 
the court concluded that the magistrate judge’s finding of a reasonable 
 
 172. Jiang, 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 205. 
 173. See id. at 205. 
 174. See id. at 207 (“[A] reasonable layperson could have understood the court’s 
statement to reserve any claim of privilege for later resolution.  Therefore, the prosecutor 
failed to prove that the defendant waived his privilege as to the information in these 
documents.”). 
 175. See id. at 205 (stating that the purpose was not designed “to invade the privacy of its 
employees”). 
 176. See id. at 208; supra notes 162–63 and accompanying text. 
 177. No. 03CV6327 (DRH)(MLO), 2006 WL 1318387, at *5–7 (E.D.N.Y. May 15, 
2006). 
 178. Id. at *2. 
 179. See id. 
 180. See id. at *1 (“(1) a draft memorandum from Plaintiff to John J. Hennessy, MWC’s 
Chief Executive Officer, prepared by Plaintiff and her counsel; (2) a ‘chronology of events’ 
describing events underlying many of Plaintiff’s claims, prepared by Plaintiff and her 
counsel; (3) drafts of Plaintiff’s EEOC complaint prepared by Plaintiff and her counsel; and 
(4) various e-mails sent amongst Plaintiff and her counsel.”). 
 181. See id. at *3. 
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expectation of privacy was not clearly erroneous or contrary to law.182  
Without more evidence of actual monitoring, the court found that the 
employee’s expectation of privacy allowed the attorney-client privilege to 
attach to the communications.183 
At least one court has held that the privilege attaches even without a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.  In Sims v. Lakeside School, the 
defendant school brought a motion to compel review of a former 
employee’s laptop hard drive that had been furnished by the defendant 
school.184  The Western District of Washington held that the former 
employee had no reasonable expectation of privacy because the employee 
signed a policy that limits the use of the laptop to academic and 
administrative purposes and states that “user accounts are the property of 
Lakeside Schools.”185  In spite of the employer’s policy, the court held that 
any material created to communicate with his attorney would be protected 
under attorney-client privilege.186  The court stated that “public policy” 
dictated that these materials be protected, implying that the court’s 
overriding consideration was the purpose of the privilege—to promote 
candid communications between clients and their attorneys.187 
The D.C. District Court found in Convertino v. U.S. Department of 
Justice that an employee’s expectation of confidentiality in monitored 
emails was objectively reasonable.188  The plaintiff, an Assistant U.S. 
Attorney, had been the lead trial counsel in a case under investigation by the 
Department of Justice’s (DOJ’s) Office of Professional Responsibility.189  
One of the investigators retained private counsel and used his DOJ email 
address to communicate with the private counsel.190  During the course of 
the investigation, an article discussing the investigation was published in 
the Detroit Free Press and the plaintiff, who had been the subject of the 
investigation, sued the DOJ for leaking information in violation of the 
Privacy Act.191 
The plaintiff moved to compel discovery of the DOJ investigator’s 
emails that were sent from his DOJ account to his personal attorney.192  The 
 
 182. See id. at *8.  Interestingly, the Curto court held that cases considering the 
expectation of privacy in the workplace are not dispositive of the issue of expectation of 
confidentiality, but then used Asia Global Crossing’s four-factor test to determine the 
expectation of confidentiality (a test which that court had derived from expectation of 
privacy cases). See supra notes 8–10 and accompanying text. 
 183. See Curto, 2006 WL 1318387, at *8–9. 
 184. No. C06-1412RSM, 2007 WL 2745367, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 20, 2007). 
 185. Id. 
 186. See id. at *2. 
 187. See id. (“Notwithstanding defendant Lakeside’s policy in its employee manual, 
public policy dictates that such communications shall be protected to preserve the sanctity of 
communications made in confidence.”). 
 188. 674 F. Supp. 2d 97, 110 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 189. See id. at 100. 
 190. See id. at 108. 
 191. See id. at 100. 
 192. See id. 
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court cited Asia Global Crossing’s four-factor test and concluded that, 
despite the DOJ’s policy of monitoring personal emails, the employee’s 
expectation of privacy was reasonable.193  The court overlooked that the 
DOJ had a policy of accessing personal emails, but instead focused on the 
fourth factor of the Asia Global Crossing test:  the DOJ employee stated 
that he was “unaware that they would be regularly accessing and saving e-
mail sent from his account.”194  Because of this lack of awareness, the 
employee’s expectation of privacy was held to be reasonable, and the court 
allowed the privilege to protect the employee’s emails.195 
For one final example of a court finding an objectively reasonable 
expectation of confidentiality in electronic communications despite an 
employer’s monitoring policy, consider United States v. Nagle.196  In this 
case, a client prepared a chronology of events at the request of his attorney 
in anticipation of criminal charges and stored the file on a laptop.197  After 
the employer fired him, he was not allowed to retrieve files from the laptop, 
but another employee retrieved the file and emailed it to a different 
employee who was also facing criminal charges.198  The document was then 
turned over by that employee’s attorney to the government in discovery, 
which led the defendant’s attorney to assert that attorney-client privilege 
protected the document.199 
In finding that the client’s expectation of confidentiality in a file stored 
on his work laptop was objectively reasonable, the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania drew upon two of the factors from Asia Global Crossing:  
first, the client’s company had no policy explicitly banning the use of work 
computers for personal reasons (it simply stated that “email activity is NOT 
private”); second, there was no evidence that the client’s company had ever 
monitored its employees’ use of the computers or email.200  Thus the court 
concluded that the defendant employee had an objectively reasonable 
expectation of privacy and therefore the document was protected by 
attorney-client privilege.201 
In addition to the previous six examples, other courts have found an 
employee’s expectation of confidentiality to be objectively reasonable 
under still different circumstances.202  Though each of the courts reached 
the same conclusion based on the same test, each court’s analysis was 
distinct.  For example, none of the courts explicitly stated the two 
underlying assumptions that the Asia Global Crossing court stated at the 
 
 193. See id. at 110. 
 194. Id. 
 195. See id. 
 196. No. 1:09-CR-384, 2010 WL 3896200 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2010). 
 197. See id. at *1. 
 198. See id. at *2. 
 199. See id. at *3. 
 200. Id. at *3–4. 
 201. See id. at *3. 
 202. See, e.g., Orbit One Commc’ns, Inc. v. Numerex Corp., 255 F.R.D. 98, 108 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
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outset of its analysis.203  Moreover, each of the courts found different 
factors to be dispositive:  in Curto, it was the lack of evidence of actual 
monitoring; in Convertino, it was the employee’s lack of awareness that his 
employer monitored him; in Nagle, the court seemed to require that the 
policy explicitly ban personal use instead of simply stating that emails were 
not private; and in Sims, public policy concerns were enough to override the 
lack of an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy.204 
2.  Courts Finding the Employee Waived the Privilege Because the 
Employee Did Not Have an Objectively Reasonable Expectation of 
Confidentiality 
In contrast to the above cases, some courts have held that attorney-client 
privilege was implicitly waived by an employee’s use of an employer’s 
computer with a monitoring policy.  These cases are similar to those 
analyzed in the previous subpart:  like those cases, the courts use an 
expectation of confidentiality test to determine the reasonableness of the 
employee’s expectation.  Whereas those cases held that the employee’s 
expectation of confidentiality was reasonable, the following cases conclude 
that the communications are not privileged because the employee could not 
have had a reasonable expectation of confidentiality. 
In Hanson v. First National Bank, an employee’s personal attorney 
objected to the disclosure of emails sent on the bank’s system in preparation 
for criminal proceedings based on attorney-client privilege.205  The 
handbook of the bank stated that it “maintain[ed] the right and the ability to 
enter any [voicemail and electronic mail] systems and to inspect and review 
any and all data recorded on those systems.”206  The court used Asia Global 
Crossing’s test and found that the employer’s reservation of the right to 
inspect was sufficient to make employees’ expectation of privacy 
unreasonable; thus the employee had “effectively waived the attorney-client 
privilege” in using the bank’s computing system in communicating with his 
criminal attorney.207 
More recently, the Southern District of Texas reached a similar holding 
in a bankruptcy proceeding in In re Royce Homes LP.208  The bankruptcy 
trustee moved to compel production of documents from the debtor’s owner 
 
 203. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
 204. The discrepancies in how the objective reasonableness test is applied—even within 
courts reaching the same conclusion—tends to support the idea that the courts are simply 
making an outcome determinative calculation that the privilege is too important to be 
trumped by an employer monitoring policy. See 1 RICE, supra note 11, § 6.8 (“[C]ourts may 
simply conclude that the importance of attorney-client communications is sufficiently great 
to preclude employers from knowingly violating them, regardless of announced policies.”). 
 205. No. 5:10-0906, 2011 WL 5201430, at *1 (S.D. W. Va. Oct. 31, 2011). 
 206. Id. at *2. 
 207. Id. at *6. 
 208. 449 B.R. 709, 732–33 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011), appeal dismissed, 466 B.R. 81 (S.D. 
Tex. 2012). 
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after the owner asserted attorney-client privilege.209  The documents had 
been sent and received via the debtor’s computer system, which was 
covered by a policy that allowed monitoring of the communications at any 
time.210  The court adopted Asia Global Crossing’s four-factor test and 
found that the employee waived attorney-client privilege by communicating 
on a system covered by the employer’s policy.211  The court noted that the 
debtor had failed to introduce sufficient evidence to show either that he was 
unaware of the policy or that the policy was unenforced.212 
The Western District of Oklahoma recently compelled production of 
attorney-client communications based on the employer’s policy that it 
retained the right to monitor emails.213  The company reported that it did 
not manage personal email and did not review the contents of the 
employee’s emails, but the court nonetheless found that the policy alone 
caused the employee to waive any attorney-client privilege he may have 
had.214 
The Western District of Washington similarly found that two former 
employees had waived attorney-client privilege by leaving communications 
with their attorneys saved on laptops that they later returned to their former 
employer.215  The attorney-client communications had been created prior to 
their employment, but while employed, they stored the files on the 
company’s laptops.216  The company had a far-reaching monitoring policy 
that applied to “[a]ll resources used for electronic communications,” 
including those stored on the company’s systems.217  Despite the former 
employees’ claims that they were unaware of the policy, the court 
 
 209. See id. 
 210. See id. at 733. 
 211. See id. at 733–38 (“Accordingly, the Court finds that [the client] waived the 
attorney-client privilege as to any e-mails he sent and received via the [employer’s] 
computer system, as any communications between [the client] and his personal counsel were 
not confidential . . . .  After applying Asia Global and its progeny, the evidence in this 
dispute strongly tips in the Trustee’s favor.”). 
 212. See id. at 733 n.14. 
 213. See Chechele v. Ward, No. Civ-10-1286-M, 2012 WL 4481439, at *1 (W.D. Okla. 
Sept. 28, 2012) (The company policy stated, “SandRidge reserves the right to examine, 
monitor, and regulate e-mail messages, directories and files, as well as any Internet usage 
. . . .”). 
 214. See id. at *2. 
 215. See Aventa Learning, Inc. v. K12, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1084 (W.D. Wash. 
2011). 
 216. See id. at 1092–93. 
 217. Id. at 1093 (noting that the employer policy stated in part, “KLC reserves the right to 
access, search, inspect, monitor, record, and disclose any file or stored communication, with 
or without notice to the employee, at any time for any reason to ensure that such 
communications are being used for legitimate business reasons.  Deleted e-mail messages 
may also be restored from the system.”).  Because of this policy, the court held that the 
plaintiffs waived any privilege that might have been applicable, and determined that the 
waiver should encompass all of the materials from any source that were on the company 
laptops. See id. at 1108–09. 
 3550 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
concluded that they had waived any privilege.218  In reaching this holding, 
the court used the four-factor analysis from Asia Global Crossing, and 
declined to adopt what it deemed the “no-waiver rule” for webmail, finding 
that the waiver’s scope covers anything on the former employee’s 
company-issued laptops.219 
In a similar fashion, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that a client’s 
message to his attorney written on an employer-monitored computer was 
not protected by the privilege due to waiver.220  The company’s employee 
handbook prohibited personal use of its computers.221  One of the 
company’s employees planned to quit and start a competing business and 
prepared a memorandum for his attorney on the company’s computer 
summarizing the industry and his planned resignation.222  The former 
employee deleted the document from the computer, but a forensic expert 
retrieved the document.223  The Virginia Supreme Court held that the 
attorney-client privilege was waived because the employee handbook stated 
that there was no expectation of privacy regarding the company’s 
computers.224  The court analogized the former employee’s communication 
to circumstances where a third party can overhear what is said.225 
Similar to the wide divergence in how courts determined that an 
employee held an objectively reasonable expectation of confidentiality in 
Part II.A.1, courts finding objectively unreasonable expectations of 
confidentiality also widely diverge in their analyses.  In Hanson, the court 
seemed to find an unreasonable expectation of confidentiality because of 
the pervasiveness of the monitoring policy’s language; in Royce Holmes, 
the court found that the evidence was equivocal that the employee was 
unaware of the policy or that the policy was unenforced (which was 
dispositive in reaching the opposite conclusion in Asia Global Crossing226); 
in Chechele, the court explicitly overlooked that the employer did not 
actually monitor to find that the employer’s policy alone caused privilege 
waiver (which was dispositive in reaching the opposite holding in 
Curto227); in Aventa, the court dismissed the employees’ claims that they 
were unaware of the policy (which was dispositive of finding the 
 
 218. See id. at 1106 (“Such waiver would encompass all of the materials he placed or 
saved from any source onto his KCDL laptop computer.  His belated attempt to assert the 
attorney-client privilege approximately a year and a half later is futile.”). 
 219. Id. at 1109–10. 
 220. See Banks v. Mario Indus. of Va., Inc., 650 S.E.2d 687, 695–96 (Va. 2007). 
 221. See id. at 690 (“[The e]mployee handbook prohibited:  the unauthorized removal of 
files from the computer and information systems, removing or copying Mario’s documents, 
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 222. See id. at 691. 
 223. See id. at 695. 
 224. See id. at 695–96. 
 225. See id. 
 226. See supra note 163 and accompanying text. 
 227. See supra note 183 and accompanying text. 
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communication privileged in Convertino228) to hold that the communication 
was not privileged; in Banks, the court found that the employee handbook 
policy that computer usage was not private was dispositive in finding the 
communication not privileged (but with nearly identical employee 
handbook language in Nagle, the court there found the communication to be 
privileged229). 
In short, courts apply the objective reasonableness test from Asia Global 
Crossing in vastly different ways.  Because each court has chosen what 
factual circumstances are dispositive, courts hold that attorney-client 
communications are privileged in some instances and nonprivileged other 
instances—even when faced with remarkably similar factual circumstances.  
As a result, the case law on the objective reasonableness of an employee’s 
expectation of confidentiality is neither consistent nor predictable. 
B.  Approach Two:  The Privilege Does Not Attach Because the Employer 
Monitoring Makes the Communication Nonconfidential 
While the vast majority of courts use the objective reasonableness test,230 
other courts do not reach the expectation of confidentiality analysis because 
they take a formalistic approach and focus on the lack of confidentiality. 
In Long v. Marubeni America Corp., the defendant, plaintiffs’ former 
employer, moved to compel disclosure of twenty-five emails between the 
plaintiffs and their private attorney.231  The plaintiffs had sent the emails on 
company-issued computers but had used private, password-protected email 
accounts.232  The defendant’s employee handbook, which one of the 
plaintiffs had helped to prepare, stated that “use of the systems for personal 
purposes are (sic) prohibited” and advised that the company retained the 
right to monitor any matter “‘stored in, created, received, or sent over the e-
 
 228. See supra notes 192–95 and accompanying text. 
 229. See supra notes 200–01 and accompanying text. 
 230. In addition to the cases highlighted in Part II.A.2, see United States v. Angevine, 281 
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expectation of privacy in the contents of a private password-protected email sent from his 
work computer); United States v. Monroe, 50 M.J. 550, 558 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1999) 
(finding that the defendant had no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the email 
system maintained by the government because that system was “for official business only” 
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of Reno, 932 F. Supp. 1232, 123435 (D. Nev. 1996); Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 
97, 101 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
 231. No. 05Civ.639(GEL)(KNF), 2006 WL 2998671, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2006). 
 232. See id. 
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mail, voice mail, word processing, and/or internet systems provided’ by [the 
defendant].”233 
The Southern District of New York first found that ten of the twenty-five 
emails were not covered by the privilege because they were not 
communications between a client and an attorney for the purpose of 
obtaining legal advice.234  The court then held that the remaining fifteen 
emails were not privileged because “the Court is convinced that [the 
plaintiffs] knew or should have known of [the employee handbook 
policy].”235  Because one of the plaintiffs had helped prepare the employee 
handbook, and because the company sent annual reminders about its policy, 
the court found that the employees must have voluntarily disregarded the 
email monitoring policy.236  The court expressly refused to apply the 
inadvertent disclosure doctrine, finding that the plaintiffs would have had to 
accidentally send the emails to be able to claim inadvertent disclosure—but 
because the plaintiffs had voluntarily sent the emails to their attorneys, the 
emails were not confidential in fact, and thus the attorney-client privilege 
could not attach.237  In other words, the emails lacked confidentiality at the 
outset, and thus were immediately ineligible for attorney-client privilege. 
Similarly, the court in Scott v. Beth Israel Medical Center found that 
monitoring of attorney-client communications rendered the 
communications nonconfidential and thus were nonprivileged.238  In 
preparation for a dispute between the hospital and a doctor, the doctor 
corresponded with his private attorney on the hospital’s email system.239  
The hospital’s counsel sent a letter to the doctor’s attorney informing him 
of the hospital’s possession of attorney-client emails and stating that any 
potential privilege had been waived by the doctor by using the hospital’s 
email system.240  The doctor then filed a motion for a protective order 
seeking return of the emails.241  The court denied the protective order, 
finding that the employer’s handbook policy had the same effect as having 
the employer looking over the doctor’s shoulder as he sent the email.242  
The court distinguished cases that upheld the privilege based on the fact 
 
 233. Id. (alteration in original). 
 234. See id. at *3. 
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 237. Id. at *3–4. 
 238. 847 N.Y.S.2d 436 (Sup. Ct. 2007). 
 239. See id. at 438. 
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that the hospital’s email policy banned all personal use—not just certain 
personal uses.243 
Holmes v. Petrovich Development Co. is a third example of a court 
holding that email monitoring precluded attorney-client privilege because of 
the confidentiality requirement.244  A former employee brought an action 
for sexual harassment and moved for the employer to return emails 
communicated between her and her attorney from her work computer.245  
Unable to reach an agreement about the privileged status of the emails, the 
parties entered into a stipulated protective order where the defendant would 
not use any documents without first giving the plaintiff forty-five days’ 
written notice.246  However, the defendant then substituted counsel, and the 
new counsel used the emails in support of the defendant’s motion for 
summary judgment without giving notice.247  The appellate court affirmed 
that the emails were not protected by the attorney-client privilege “because 
they were not private.”248  The court emphasized that not only did the 
company ban computer use for personal matters but the plaintiff also had 
been advised that her email communications were accessible by her alleged 
harasser.249  The court did not cite or use Asia Global Crossing’s four-part 
test and rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the company never actually 
accessed or audited employee’s computers.250  The court called it 
“immaterial” that the “operational reality” was that the company did not 
actually monitor the employees’ communications.251 
In Long, Scott, and Holmes, the courts found that the employees’ 
communications with their attorneys were not privileged because the 
communications had been monitored by the employers and thus lacked 
 
 243. See id. at 441.  Though the court concluded that the communications were not 
confidential, and thus not privileged, the court also analyzed whether the client’s expectation 
of confidentiality was reasonable under the four factors of the Asia Global Crossing test and 
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the communications were not confidential in fact. See id. at 442–44. 
 244. 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 878 (Ct. App. 2011). 
 245. See id. at 893. 
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monitored to make sure employees are not using them to send personal e-mail, it is 
immaterial that the ‘operational reality’ is the company does not actually do so.”). 
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confidentiality.  Each of the courts used a more formalistic approach than 
the courts in Part II.A.  Instead of using the reasonableness or 
unreasonableness of the employee’s expectation of confidentiality as 
justification to reach their holdings, they emphasized that the 
communications were not confidential in fact. 
C.  Approach Three:  Professor Rice’s View—All Attorney-Client 
Communications Are Privileged Notwithstanding Employer Monitoring 
Because Confidentiality Should Not Be Required  
As outlined in Part I.B.3, Professor Paul Rice argues that confidentiality 
has no place in attorney-client privilege doctrine.252  Though he never 
argued for the abolition of the confidentiality requirement specifically in the 
context of employer-monitored communications,253 Professor Rice has 
argued that the privilege should attach to any communication between a 
lawyer and a client, regardless of whether a third party is present.  This 
presumably includes an employer who electronically monitors 
employees.254 
III.  A FOURTH APPROACH:  ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE SHOULD 
ATTACH IF THE EMPLOYEE BELIEVED THE COMMUNICATION WAS 
CONFIDENTIAL NOTWITHSTANDING THE EMPLOYER’S MONITORING 
Part III proposes a fourth approach for analyzing whether the privilege 
should attach to an employer-monitored attorney-client communication.  
While courts should adopt previous scholars’ proposals that attorneys or 
employers should limit attorney-client communications from being read by 
a third party,255 once an employer accesses an otherwise privileged 
communication, Part III argues that courts should consider only the 
subjective intent of the employee to keep her attorney communication 
confidential. 
The Supreme Court has stated that 
the attorney and client must be able to predict with some degree of 
certainty whether particular discussions will be protected.  An uncertain 
privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in widely varying 
applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at all.256 
Just as the Supreme Court values the public policy underlying the 
privilege,257 the Court also seeks to promote certainty and predictability in 
determining whether a communication is privileged.  Part II of this Note 
outlined the divergence in courts’ approaches as to whether attorney-client 
privilege attaches to employer-monitored communications between 
 
 252. See supra Part I.B.3. 
 253. See 1 RICE, supra note 11, § 6.8. 
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 255. See supra Part I.D. 
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 2013] EMPLOYER MONITORING OF EMPLOYEE EMAIL 3555 
attorneys and their clients.258  Given the wide divergence in the case law, 
there is an evident need for a test that satisfies the Court’s call for certainty 
and predictability in attorney-client privilege doctrine.  This section first 
addresses the benefits and limitations of the first three approaches before 
advocating for a new approach—the subjective belief test. 
A.  The Benefits and Limitations of the Three Approaches 
This section discusses the benefits and limitations of each of the three 
approaches described in Part II:  first, the objective reasonableness test; 
second, the automatically nonprivileged approach; and third, the 
automatically privileged approach.259 
The majority of courts faced with the issue of whether the privilege 
should attach to an employer-monitored electronic communication consider 
whether the employee had an objectively reasonable expectation of 
confidentiality in that communication.260  Courts generally have used 
similar analyses (derived from Asia Global Crossing’s four-part test), and 
this approach has the benefit of giving courts the flexibility to delve into 
fact-specific circumstances to weigh the factors that tend to make an 
employee’s expectation of confidentiality in his or her communication 
reasonable or unreasonable.  When there are some facts in the record that 
make the employee’s belief seem reasonable and some facts that make it 
seem unreasonable, this approach allows a court to balance the goal of 
truth-seeking against the goals of attorney-client privilege.261 
However, the objective reasonableness approach has many limitations.  
First, as the divergent case law illustrates, courts that apply the test to 
similar factual situations veer apart in their conclusions regarding whether 
an employee’s belief in the confidentiality of his or her communication was 
reasonable.262  This test therefore fails to meet the Supreme Court’s 
mandate that the privilege doctrine should be consistent and predictable so 
that attorneys and clients can anticipate in advance whether a 
communication will be privileged.263  In turn, this could lead clients to be 
unsure of whether their expectation of confidentiality is reasonable and 
 
 258. This divergence in analyses lead to disparate holdings in the face of remarkably 
similar fact patterns. See supra Part II; see also Adam C. Losey, Clicking Away 
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 259. See supra Part II. 
 260. See supra note 230 and accompanying text. 
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 262. Compare supra Part II.A.1, with supra Part II.A.2. 
 263. See supra note 256 and accompanying text. 
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could cause a chilling effect on client candor.  Because this approach 
decreases clients’ propensity to speak candidly with their attorneys, it 
undermines the public policy justification of the privilege.264 
Second, the objective reasonableness approach may also be difficult to 
justify doctrinally because it is derived from the Fourth Amendment 
expectation of privacy test.265  For example, at least one circuit court has 
held that the Fourth Amendment’s expectation of privacy analysis is 
distinct from and should not be confounded with the attorney-client 
privilege analysis.266  Third, the objective reasonableness test requires 
attorneys to expend resources to determine whether their clients’ 
employers’ monitoring policies prohibit private communications.  Fourth, 
courts must also expend resources to conduct complex, fact-specific 
inquiries to determine whether the client’s belief in confidentiality was 
reasonable. 
The second approach—that monitored communications are, by 
definition, not confidential and thus the privilege cannot attach—also has 
benefits and limitations.  First, it is beneficial because it serves as a bright-
line rule that is relatively easy for courts to apply.  As long as an employer 
has access to an employee’s communications, those communications cannot 
be privileged.  This approach has the additional benefits of promoting the 
court’s truth-seeking function and promoting fairness for the client’s 
adversary.  The adversary only needs to show that a third party had access 
to the communication to undermine the employee’s privilege claim.  
Therefore, courts following this approach will invariably permit the 
disclosure of more communications than under the first or third approaches, 
providing more evidence to the adversary and the court.267 
However, this second approach yields a serious drawback.  Because 
people generally believe that their emails are private,268 this approach 
punishes clients who have a mistaken but honest beliefs that their emails are 
confidential by stripping their communications of privilege protection.  This 
approach therefore creates a chilling effect that undermines the public 
policy goal of the privilege.  Because they are unable to understand 
monitoring technology, prudent clients may refrain from communicating 
with their attorneys due to the chance that some type of electronic 
monitoring covers their communication—even if their email is strictly 
confidential.  In other words, this approach discourages clients from using 
even safe channels of communication.  Whereas the first approach chills 
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client candor because it is unpredictable, this approach chills client candor 
because it prevents communications over channels that a client merely 
suspects may be monitored. 
The third approach—that confidentiality should not be required so 
employer monitoring has no effect on privilege—also has benefits and 
limitations.  No court has adopted this approach yet, but like the second 
approach, it would serve as a bright-line rule that would be relatively easy 
for courts to apply.  A court would only need to consider whether the 
communication was made between attorneys and clients for the purpose of 
seeking or obtaining legal advice to determine the communication’s 
privilege status.269  This approach would have the additional benefit of 
encouraging client candor, though perhaps impermissibly so:  it subverts the 
idea that there is no need to protect communications about which the client 
is willing to let others know.270  Abolishing the confidentiality requirement 
would undermine a limiting function that serves the court’s truth-seeking 
process because courts would lose otherwise-admissible evidence that the 
client never intended to be confidential.271  In other words, a court may 
refuse to admit valuable information to which the fact-finder would 
otherwise be entitled because of the mere fact that the client had 
communicated that information to his or her attorney.  By limiting 
potentially valuable evidentiary information, the third approach is the least 
fair to the client’s adversary. 
In sum, each of the three approaches has both benefits and limitations.  
The final part of this Note argues that while attorneys and employers should 
seek to avoid monitored communications from losing the privilege, once a 
monitored communication has been intercepted and read, the client’s 
subjective belief that the communication was confidential should govern 
whether the communication is privileged. 
B. The Client’s Subjective Belief That the Communication Remained 
Confidential Should Govern Whether the Monitored Communication Is 
Privileged 
This part argues for a three-pronged approach.  First, lawyers should seek 
to prevent nonconfidential communications from occurring by discussing 
how a lack of confidentiality in their clients’ workplace systems might 
undermine attorney-client privilege.  Second, if attorney-client 
communications have been monitored, employers should attempt to avoid 
reading attorney-client communications so that, even though they were 
technically nonconfidential, courts may still consider them privileged.  
Third, courts should allow the privilege to attach when the employee 
believed that her communications with her attorney were confidential. 
 
 269. See supra notes 114–17 and accompanying text. 
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First, courts should adopt elements of the ABA Formal Opinion and find 
that lawyers have an ethical duty—and perhaps a constitutional duty in 
criminal cases under the Sixth Amendment’s right to effective counsel—to 
inform their clients of the risks of communicating via email.272  Prudent 
lawyers should protect against the possibility that sensitive information will 
be communicated in a way that is accessible to any third party.273  
Similarly, courts or legislatures should adopt a rule that employers that 
monitor employee communications must use a two-tiered recording system, 
where the employer walls off recorded information until a lawyer or court 
reviews them for nonprivileged materials.274 
Taken together, these two strategies have a few benefits.  First, they 
avoid nonconfidential communications from occurring in the first place, 
and when such conversations do occur, they prevent them from becoming 
nonprivileged.  Additionally, they encourage client literacy by requiring 
lawyers to discuss electronic monitoring with their clients.  In turn, these 
strategies promote the privilege’s purpose of encouraging client candor in 
situations where the client knows that the communication is strictly 
confidential.275  Finally, these proposals reallocate the risk that the 
communication is not privileged from the employee to either the lawyer or 
employer.  This risk reallocation protects the client because it allows the 
court to hold either the client’s lawyer or employer culpable when an 
attorney-client communication loses its privileged status.276 
Once a monitored attorney-client communication has been read by an 
employer, courts should consider only the subjective belief of the client that 
the communication was confidential.  Such a test is consistent with the 
privilege doctrine because it is analogous to widely accepted exceptions to 
confidentiality.277  Like those exceptions, this one would promote the 
Supreme Court’s stated goals for attorney-client privilege.278  By relying 
solely on subjective belief, this test serves the privilege’s purpose of 
promoting client candor.  A client will communicate openly because it is 
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Federal Rule of Evidence 502, 58 S.C. L. REV. 211 (2006). 
 278. See supra notes 18, 256 and accompanying text. 
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the client’s understanding that dictates whether the privilege attaches.279  
Additionally, the attorney and the client can accurately predict—even in 
advance of any litigation—which communications will or will not be 
privileged.280  Thus, similar to the widely accepted exceptions to strict 
confidentiality,281 the subjective belief test mirrors the Supreme Court’s 
goals of promoting client candor and yielding a consistent, predictable 
privilege doctrine. 
The subjective belief test is not only justifiable based on the expansion of 
the confidentiality requirement’s exceptions, however; the test also yields 
more benefits and fewer limitations than the other three approaches.282  
First, the fact-finding required to determine what is an objectively 
reasonable expectation not only yields disparate holdings283 but is also 
burdensome for both attorneys and courts.284  A test that relies solely on the 
client’s subjective belief that the communications were confidential would 
not require courts or attorneys to inquire beyond the client’s beliefs.  This 
would save attorney and court resources and reduce litigation costs.285 
Second, the bright-line rules of the second and third approaches are 
overbroad in that they either impermissibly punish a client with an honest 
yet unreasonable expectation of confidentiality in his communication, or 
burden the court’s truth-seeking by privileging communications that the 
client did not intend to be confidential.286  But the subjective belief test 
strikes a balance between these extremes.  It avoids punishing those clients 
who had an honest belief in the confidentiality of their email, and it avoids 
privileging communications that the client did not intend to be confidential. 
Third, the subjective belief test is relatively easy for clients to understand 
because it is based on their internal beliefs and not external factors such as 
their employers’ monitoring policy or complex case law.  The goal of 
promoting the client’s understanding of when the privilege attaches should 
not be underestimated, especially given the current empirical evidence 
showing that clients do not understand the privilege.287  An easy-to-
understand privilege doctrine may have additional social policy benefits, 
 
 279. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.  Moreover, a test that relies solely on 
subjective belief may increase candor by increasing the frequency of communications 
between an attorney and client; the objectively reasonable test may prevent a prudent lawyer 
and prudent client from communicating via email thereby hindering the frequency of their 
communications. 
 280. See supra note 256 and accompanying text. 
 281. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 282. See supra Part III.A. 
 283. Compare supra Part II.A.1, with Part II.A.2. 
 284. See supra notes 114–19 and accompanying text. 
 285. See supra notes 113–18 and accompanying text. 
 286. See supra Part III.A. 
 287. Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351, 383 (1989) 
(finding that 42 percent of surveyed clients believed confidentiality was absolute, 25 percent 
believed that confidentiality rules allowed more liberal disclosure, and 32.8 percent correctly 
believed that lawyers must maintain confidentiality with certain exceptions). 
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such as preventing clients from fearing or hating their lawyers or 
employers. 
Finally, the subjective belief approach allows for flexibility as new 
monitoring technologies emerge.  Part of the problem with the current case 
law is that courts have reacted slowly to novel monitoring techniques, and 
have attempted to graft traditional in-person confidentiality doctrines onto 
an online context.288  But as monitoring techniques evolve, employees may 
have an even harder time understanding or identifying when their 
communications are monitored.  Applying the privilege whenever the client 
believes that his or her communication was confidential allows the privilege 
to evolve along with advancements in monitoring technologies.  Even 
though an employee’s belief may be increasingly unreasonable given the 
growing pervasiveness of employee monitoring, privilege doctrine should 
reallocate the risk of nonconfidentiality and not punish those clients who 
honestly believed that their communication was confidential. 
However, this Note’s proposal of relying solely on the subjective intent 
of the client is not without its own limitations.  For one, the approach relies 
on the internal beliefs of the client.  Reliance on the internal mental 
processes of one party creates an evidentiary problem—how can the client 
prove his subjective belief or his adversary prove the opposite?  For 
example, consider a client who did not read the employee handbook before 
signing the policy, and thus was unaware of the monitoring policy and 
honestly believed his communications were confidential.  A court may be 
hesitant to apply the privilege to this employee’s communications because 
such a holding may discourage future employees from reading their 
employer policies in order to remain ignorant.  As another example, 
consider an employee who is aware of the monitoring policy, but holds an 
honest but mistaken belief that it is not enforced.  Under the proposed 
subjective belief test, the client holds an honest belief that his 
communications are confidential and thus the privilege should attach.  But a 
court may be reluctant to apply the privilege to this employee’s 
communications because this could discourage future employees from 
seeking out information about whether their employer’s enforce their 
monitoring policies.  Moreover, situations like these could lead to 
protracted factual determinations as to whether the client actually held an 
 
 288. This Note has focused exclusively on the confidentiality requirement of attorney-
client privilege in the context of employer monitoring of employee communications.  There 
are a few reasons why the test for electronic communications should be different from in-
person communications:  (1) electronic communications are uniquely exposed to third party 
monitoring in ways that traditional communications are not; (2) because of the rapid pace of 
technology, people are more likely to have a reasonable but mistaken belief in confidentiality 
while communicating electronically; and (3) there is comparatively little that a client could 
do to show the reasonableness of his belief in the confidentiality of electronic 
communications compared to in-person communications.  Future scholarship should 
consider the soundness of the objective reasonableness test in other contexts beyond 
employer-monitoring of electronic communications. 
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honest belief that her communication was confidential.  This wastes judicial 
resources and increases litigation costs. 
An additional problem with the subjective intent approach is that it 
undermines the court’s truth-seeking role.  Sole reliance on subjective belief 
potentially allows the client to override his adversary’s challenge to his 
privilege assertion by simply stating that he believed the communication 
was confidential.  Relatedly, the subjective intent approach may lead some 
clients to commit perjury.  It allows clients to swear after-the-fact that they 
believed that their communication was confidential, due to the lack of 
evidence to the contrary. 
To illustrate how the subjective belief test would alter a court’s privilege 
determination—and in turn yield an outcome more in line with the 
privilege’s public policy goals—consider a recent case from the Eastern 
District of New York.289  An employee, who had never authorized his 
attorney to communicate confidential materials through his work email, 
received a list of his assets as his attorney was preparing his will.290  During 
an unrelated investigation, the company found the email and discovered that 
the employee had undisclosed ownership interests in companies owned by 
his employer’s vendors.291  The employee “forwarded [the email] to a non-
[work] email account, deleted the email from [his] inbox and . . . instructed 
[his attorney] to send confidential information only to another email address 
[he] had previously given her and not to [his work] email address.”292  The 
employee moved for an order precluding the government from introducing 
the email at trial, and the court used the Asia Global Crossing objective 
reasonableness test to hold that the former employee had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in any of the communications made through his 
email account.293 
Consider how this Note’s proposed three-pronged test would lead to a 
different analysis.294  First, the court did not consider whether the 
employee’s lawyer breached a duty by unilaterally sending a confidential 
email to his client’s monitored email account.  The employee contended 
that he had never authorized the attorney to use that account for confidential 
uses and that he had only used it for scheduling purposes.295  The first 
prong of this Note’s test would reallocate the culpability for the 
nonconfidential communication from the client to the attorney because the 
employee passively, unwillingly received the email.296  Second, the court 
 
 289. United States v. Finazzo, No. 10-CR-457(RRM)(RML), 2013 WL 619572 
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2013). 
 290. See id. at *1. 
 291. See id. at *2. 
 292. Id. at *1. 
 293. Id. at *11. 
 294. The court found an alternative ground (waiver) for finding the email nonprivileged; 
the opinion discussed the alternative ground after determining that the employee did not 
have an objectively reasonable expectation of confidentiality in his email. See id. at *13. 
 295. See id. at *12. 
 296. See id. at *1. 
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continued the trend of reaching a privilege determination by emphasizing 
one or two elements of the Asia Global Crossing test.297  For instance, the 
court downplayed that the CEO used the email system for personal use and 
that there was no evidence that the company had ever monitored email use 
before.298  The third prong of this Note’s test would supplant this 
unpredictable, candor-quashing test with a single question:  Did the 
employee subjectively believe his communications were confidential?  In 
United States v. Finazzo, the court may well have found that the deletion of 
the email invalidated the defendant’s claim that he believed the 
communication was confidential.  In other words, why would the employee 
have warned his attorney not to email him on his work account and then 
have deleted the email if he subjectively believed it was confidential?  
Skeptics who believe that a subjective test may be abused by post hoc 
claims should note that the determination of subjective belief still relies on 
a court’s finding that such a belief existed at the time of the communication.  
In short, this Note’s three-pronged proposal may have led the court to reach 
the same holding about the email’s privilege status; however, rather than 
punish the client, this Note’s three-pronged approach would have led the 
court to hold the attorney culpable.  This approach will make the privilege 
doctrine simpler, more predictable, and will better promote future client 
candor. 
CONCLUSION 
Lawyers should seek to prevent nonconfidential communications from 
occurring by discussing the risks of using an employer’s electronic systems 
at the outset of representation.  Additionally, employers should do their part 
by refraining from reading potentially privileged communications until an 
outside lawyer or court has reviewed them for privilege status.  But even 
with these precautions, employers will nevertheless monitor, record, and 
read private attorney-client privileged communications.  At this point, no 
perfect solution exists for courts to determine whether attorney-client 
privilege should attach—each approach has drawbacks and limitations. 
However, just because no perfect solution exists does not mean that the 
attorney-client privilege doctrine should not be improved.  This Note has 
argued that the attorney-client privilege should incorporate a new exception 
to the confidentiality requirement:  when an employer monitors an 
employee’s communication, that communication is not strictly confidential, 
but if the employee honestly believes that it was, the privilege should 
attach.  In short, the subjective intent approach proposed by this Note is the 
 
 297. See supra Part II.A.2. and accompanying text. 
 298. See Finazzo, 2013 WL 619572, at *9–10.  The lack of actual monitoring was 
determinative in finding an objectively reasonable expectation of confidentiality in previous 
cases in the Eastern District of New York. See, e.g., United States v. Hatfield, No. 06-CR-
0550(JS), 2009 WL 3806300, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2009); Curto v. Medical World 
Commc’ns, No. 03CV6327(DRH)(MLO), 2006 WL 1318387, at *5–7 (E.D.N.Y. May 15, 
2006). 
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least-bad solution because it protects clients who have an honest but 
unreasonable belief that their email is confidential.  As a matter of public 
policy, courts should refrain from using a test that results in limiting 
attorney-client privilege to only smart, reasonable clients.  Courts should 
adopt a test that makes the privilege available to unsophisticated or 
unreasonable, yet honest clients. 
Future scholarship should consider the subjective belief approach in other 
workplace modes of communication or other electronic communications 
outside of the workplace setting.  For instance, should a voicemail that a 
lawyer leaves on an employee’s cellphone without knowing that the phone 
was employer-owned be privileged?  Or should a photocopy made by a 
client on an employer-owned Xerox machine that automatically stores a 
copy onto the machine’s hard drive be privileged?  The subjective intent 
approach may also have ramifications outside of the workplace context.  If 
an indigent client must use a public library’s or internet cafe’s computer to 
send his attorney documents, does the library’s or internet cafe’s monitoring 
policy render those materials nonprivileged? 
As twenty-first century technologies pose new dilemmas in 
confidentiality, courts should return to the underlying purpose of the 
attorney-client privilege.  This will ensure that the doctrine evolves and 
continues to promote client candor and effective representation in a way 
that is consistent and predictable for attorneys and clients alike. 
